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The aim of the thesis is to establish whether the European Agenda on Migration 
(EAM) (Immediate Action),1 formulated to curb the Africa-EU irregular migration 
“crisis” complies with international law. The thesis commences by arguing that 
migration today is a bastion of state sovereignty2 though fettered to a very limited 
extent by human rights3, international law and states‟ inter-dependence.4 The thesis 
then discusses the right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement under 
international law. This is followed by a discussion on the EU as “sui generis” supra 
national entity that champions human rights and the rule of law globally followed 
by a review of its “sui generis” immigration law and rules under which the EU and 
member states share competence. Fundamental terminologies in the migration 
discourse: Migrants, Irregular Migrants, Refugees and Asylum-Seekers are 
defined. A critique of The Refugee Convention5 is done, revealing its parochial,6 
Eurocentric7, racist,8 and sexist9 nature, factors that to a large extent make it 
divorced from the realities of today‟s refugee dynamics yet the Convention is the 
centrepiece of international refugee protection.10 The thesis then interrogates the 
Africa-EU irregular mass-migration; the push and pull factors as well as the 
general modus operandi are reviewed. The generally recognised routes; Western 
Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean and West African which facilitate the 
                                                          
1
 The European Commission, Communication from The Commission to the European  Parliament, The Council, 
The European Economic and Social  Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European Agenda on 
Migration, Brussels, 13.5.2015, COM(2015) 240 final, Page 2, Para 1, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf 
accessed 11/8/2017 at 18.10 
2
 Catherine Dauvergne, Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times, The Modern Law Review, 
Volume 67, Issue 4, July 2004, Pages 588–615, Page 588, Para 1, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2004.00501.x/full accessed 
12/9/2017 at 21.36 
3
 Richard Plender, International Migration Law, Revised 2
nd
 Edition,1988, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, Page 62, Para 1 
4
 Ibid at 61 para 3 
5
 UNGA, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 
6
 Gillian McFadyen, The Contemporary Refugee: Persecution,  Semantics and Universality, eSharp, Special Issue: 
The 1951 UN Refugee Convention - 60 Years On (2012), SSN: 1742-4542, pp. 9-35, Page 14, Para 2, 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_234569_en.pdf accessed 11/9/2017 at 13.07 
7
 Rafiqul Islam and Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan (Eds.)  An Introduction to International Refugee Law, 2013, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Page 23, Para 2 
8
 B.S Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South.” Journal of Refugee Studies 11(4): 
350–374 page 351 
9
 Asha Hans, Gender, Camps and International Norms, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group Library, Page 69, 
http://www.mcrg.ac.in/rw%20files/rw32/3.asha_hans.pdf accessed 11/9/2017 at 14.40 
10
 UNGA supra note 4, Introductory Note by the office of the UNHCR, para 1 
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migration are assessed. Lastly, the thesis then analyses the compliance of the EAM 
(Immediate Action) with international law. Each of the Immediate Actions; 1) 
Saving Lives at Sea 2) Targeting Criminal Smuggling Networks 3) Relocation 4) 
Resettlement 5) Working in partnership with third countries 6) Using the EU's tools 
to help frontline are subjected to the relevant international law governing them to 
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CJEU                    Court of Justice of the European Union 
CSDP                    Common Security and Defence Policy 
DARIO                 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations 
DASR                    Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
DCR                      Dutch Council for Refugees 
EAM                      European Agenda on Migration 
EASO                    European Asylum Support Office 
EC                          European Commission 
ECA                       European Court of Auditors 
ECtHR                   European Court of Human Rights  
ECHR                    European Convention on Human Rights 
EEAS                      European External Action Service 
EUAFR                  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
FRONTEX             European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
ICCPR                    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR                  International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
ICERD                     International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1:1 INTRODUCTION 
While having ancient historical roots in the Trans-Saharan trade, the foundations of 
contemporary Trans-Saharan migration were laid in the 1970s and 1980s when 
(former) nomads and traders started migrating to work at construction sites and the 
oil fields of southern Algeria and Libya.11 This migration was fundamentally 
influenced in the 1990s was by the radical Pan-Africanist foreign policy of Muammar 
Gadhaffi, a policy that was conceivably influenced by the embargoes imposed on 
Libya by the UN Security Council between 1992- 2000.12 Feeling betrayed by his 
fellow Arab leaders, Gadhaffi re-crafted himself as an African leader, welcoming Sub-
Saharan Africans (Sub-Saharans) to work in Libya in the spirit of Pan-Africanism.13 
However, attitudes towards immigrants hardened in Libya following an anti-
immigrant backlash against Sub-Saharans in 2000, which resulted into the deaths of 
hundreds of them.14 The government responded to the strong resentment against the 
Sub-Saharans through arbitrary detention, physical abuse, forced repatriations, etc.15 
Resultantly, irregular migration of Sub-Saharans into Libya commenced, spreading 
to other North African countries as well. (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia)16  
In the 1990s, following the establishment of the Schengen Area in Europe, the 
Southern EU states were pressurised by their Northern counterparts into 
securitisation and the tightening of their borders with their African neighbours hence 
the introduction of visa requirements for Maghrebis.17 The result was the 
commencement of irregular migration into the EU by the Maghrebis.18 Libya’s allure 
                                                          
11
 Hein De Haas, The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe, Page 1307, 
Para 2, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 7, Globalisation and Migration: New Issues, New Politics? (2008), 
pp. 1305-1322, Taylor and Francis Ltd, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20455111 accessed 22/9/2017 at 8.12 
12
 Ibid page 1307 para 2 
13
 Ibid page 1307 para 3 
14




 Ibid page 1307 para 4 -1308 para 2  
17
 Ruben Andersson, Europe’s Failed ‘Fight’ against Irregular Migration: Ethnographic notes on a 
Counterproductive Industry, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Routledge, Pages 1056--1057  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1139446 accessed 22/9/2017 at 8.29 
18
 Hein de Haas, Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union, An Overview of 
Recent Trends (Prepared for IOM) Page 16 para 4, www.unhcr.org/49e479ca0.pdf (accessed 1/1/18 11.10) 
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having gone, around 2000; Sub-Saharan Africans began joining Maghrebis in the 
irregular migrations into EU soon thereafter outnumbering the Maghrebis.19 
Moreover, many Sub-Saharan Africans began crossing directly from Libya to the EU 
hence effectively making Libya a departure country.20Today, Sub-Saharan Africans 
are the largest number of irregular migrants journeying into the EU, exceeding the 
Maghrebis.21  
Today, the EU claims to be going through a “migration crisis”.22 The arrival in 
Europe of more than 1 million asylum-seekers in 2015 unsettled the EU like no crisis 
before. The EU’s current institutional and legislative arrangements were clearly not 
up to dealing with the huge influx of asylum seekers, laying bear the deep divisions 
among the member states.23 The deplorable handling of the crisis by the EU has 
formed serious cracks in the bloc. The Dublin Regulations24 that underpin the 
immigration policy of the EU and the Schengen open border system that sustains the 
Common Market in the bloc were suspended.25 Fences and barriers have been 
erected as well as the temporary border closures within the Schengen open-border 
zone.26 The crisis was allegedly manipulated by the Leave side in the UK referendum 
whose result initiated “Brexit” .The UK exit can arguably cause a domino effect in the 
EU with more states seeking to leave the bloc, a scenario that would seal the fate of 
the EU.27 
                                                          
19
 Haas op cit note 18 page 16 para 4 
20
 Haas op cit note 11 page 1308 para 1 
21
 The European Commission, Migration on the Central Mediterranean route ; Managing flows, Saving lives, 
Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The European Council and the Council,  25
th
 January 2017, 
Brussels, Page 4, Para 1, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation- 
22
 European Commission, Migration, Background https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/migration_en 
accessed 22/9/2017 at 9.23 
23
 Stefan Lehne, How the Refugee Crisis Will Reshape the EU, 4th February 2016, Carnegie Europe, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/04/how-refugee-crisis-will-reshape-eu-pub-62650 accessed 13/9/2017 at 
14.10 
24
 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Prioritising Border Control over Human lives violations of the 
Rights of Migrants and Refugees at Sea, Policy Brief, 2014, Copenhagen, Page 7, Para 1 
25
 European Commission, Back to Schengen: Commission proposes that the Council allows Member States to 
maintain temporary controls for another three months, 25th January 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-124_en.htm accessed 13/9/2017 at 11.58 
26
 Matthew Holehouse, Refugee crisis: Austria erects fence in new strain on Schengen, The Telegraph 
Newspaper, 8th December 2015, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/austria/12040643/Refugee-crisis-Austria-erects-fence-
in-new-strain-on-Schengen.html accessed 13/9/2017 at 12.05 
27
 RT, Refugee crisis, decisive‟ for Brexit, will break EU apart – Austrian FM, 30th June 2016, 
https://www.rt.com/news/349055-refugee-crisis-brexit-austria/ accessed 13/9/2017 at 12.11 
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The following reasons give an insight into why there currently is an “EU migration 
crisis”; i) the NATO led overthrow of Gadhaffi and the subsequent instability 
responsible for the current failed state status of Libya.28 The proximity of Libya and 
the prevailing lawlessness has made it the gateway to EU for irregular migrants.29 ii) 
The global refugee crisis.30 UNHCR statistics portray that there are more displaced 
people today than after the 2nd World War.31 iii) The inherent defects of the EU 
Asylum and Refugee Policy. As per Andersson, the Schengen Agreement didn’t entail 
a common asylum and refugee policy that would ensure EU member states 
collectively bear the burden of refugees and asylum-seekers in case of an influx; 
Consequentially, the EU Southern States (Greece and Italy) have solely bore the EU 
migration pressure.32 Moreover, the Dublin Regulations posit that asylum requests 
must be made and assessed in the 1st EU state of entry, except when family members 
are established in another member state.33 iv)  The closure of legal pathways into the 
EU especially after establishing the Schengen Area, which inevitably encouraged 
irregular migration.34  v) The lack of solidarity among the EU states in managing the 
surge in asylum-seekers.35 
Currently, the principal fueler of the EU migration “crisis” is essentially the Africa-
EU irregular mass-migration most specifically the Central Mediterranean Route.36 
(Discussed in depth in Chapter 4) The closure of the Eastern Mediterranean and 
                                                          
28
 Frontex, Central Mediterranean Route, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-




 According to the UNHCR, the world is currently experiencing a global refugee crisis. Since 2011, when the 
UNHCR announced 42.5 million forcibly displaced people globally, these numbers have risen sharply each year, 
from 45.2 million in 2012 to 51.2 million in 2013 and 59.5 million in 2014. In 2015, forced displacement 
reached 65.3 million individuals by the end of 2015, UNHCR, Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2015, 
Pages 5-6, www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf accessed 9/13/2017 at 12.23 
31
 Euan Mckirdy, UNHCR Report: More displaced now than after WWII, CNN, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/20/world/unhcr-displaced-peoples-report/index.html accessed 22/9/2017 at 
9.39 
32
 Andersson op cit note 17 at 1058 para 3; ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC], 30696/09, 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22002-628%22]} (accessed 4/2/18) 
33
 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network op cit note 24 
34
 Andersson op cit note 17 at 1058 para 3 
35 Steve Scherer, Italy chides EU partners for lack of solidarity in migrant crisis, Reuters, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-refugee-day-italy-migrants/italy-chides-eu-partners-for-lack-of-solidarity-
in-migrant-crisis-idUSKBN19B281 accessed 22/9/2017 at 10.09 
36
 Frontex op cit note 28 
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West Balkans routes leaves the Central Mediterranean Route as the principal fueler 
of the “crisis”.37  
It must be noted that regardless of the internal pressures the EU is currently facing, 
owing to the surge in migrants and asylum-seekers, the general western perception 
that the EU is facing a sui generis migration “crisis” and that the EU is bearing the 
brunt of the current global refugee crisis 38 is utterly deceptive. The increasing 
numbers of refugees arriving in Europe rather than remaining in their regions 
creates the impression that Europe is experiencing an unprecedented crisis. Two-
thirds of the world’s 65.6 million displaced remain within the borders of their own 
countries. If there is a crisis, it’s one of internal displacement in the developing 
world.39 Globally, 8 out of the 10 top refugee hosting countries are in Africa, with the 
remaining 2 in the Middle East.40 Uganda for example took in more refugees in 2016 
than the total number that crossed the Mediterranean into Europe.41 
Under the above backdrop, the EU in a bid to streamline all efforts aimed at 
addressing the migration “crisis” formulated the EAM.42 The Agenda forms the back-
bone of this thesis. The thesis strictly limits itself to the Immediate Actions under the 
EAM aimed at addressing the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration.43 
                                                          
37
 European Commission, Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean; From Emergency Responses to 
Systemic Solutions, Issue 22, 2
nd
 February 2017, European Political Strategy Centre, page 1 para 3 
https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/irregular-migration-central-mediterranean_en 
(accessed 16/6/2017 20.59) 
38
 “…Let me now turn to the migration and refugee crisis… because of geography… the most responsibility is 
and will continue to be placed on Europe…” European Council President Donald Tusk, European Council, 




 Elizabeth Ferris, Unpacking the numbers on Global Refugees, 20
th
 June 2017, The Brookings Institution, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/20/unpacking-the-numbers-on-global-refugees/ 
accessed 13/9/2017 at 12.26  
40
 UNHCR, Poorer countries host most of the forcibly displaced, report shows, February 2016, 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/2/58b001ab4/poorer-countries-host-forcibly-displaced-report-
shows.html accessed 24/9/2017 at 16.42 
41
 Conor Gaffey, Uganda took in more refugees in 2016 than many wealthy European countries do all year, 
Newsweek, New York, 26
th
 January 2017, http://europe.newsweek.com/uganda-took-more-refugees-crossed-
mediterranean-2016-aid-agency-548508?rm=eu accessed 13/9/2017 at 13.19 
42





1:2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The EU claims to be experiencing a migration “crisis”.44 In order to manage it, the 
EAM was formulated with an Immediate Action plan as well as a longer term plan.45 
The Problem is that the EAM is to a greater extent plausibly incompatible with 
international law, moreover, the EAM doesn’t meet the standard of compliance with 
international law expected of the EU, which has assumed the role of a global 
champion for human rights, rule of law and democracy.46  
1:3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following are the primary research questions of this thesis: 
1. What informs the migration law and policy of states? 
2. How does the EU immigration law and policy function? 
3. Does an Africa-EU irregular mass-migration exist?  
4. Whether the EAM (Immediate Action) and its implementation, aimed at curing 
the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration and consequently the EU migration “crisis” 
conform to international law? 
5. Whether the EU and member states are plausibly liable for breaches of 
international law whilst implementing the EAM (Immediate Action) addressing the 
Africa-EU irregular mass-migration. 
1:4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
By interrogating the above Research Questions, I intend to; 
1. Disclose that the migration laws and policies are to a very large extent governed by 
state sovereignty though today human rights, international law and the inter-
dependence of states have to a very limited extent eroded the primacy of state 
sovereignty.  
                                                          
44




 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the EU and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 2007, Article 2 ; European Union, Fostering Human Rights among European (External and Internal 
Policies), Policy Brief, October 2014, Para 1, http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/policy_brief/01-
FRAME%20Policy%20Brief%20No%20%201%20--%2017%20November%202014.pdf  (accessed 8/1/17 8.45) 
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2. Reveal the sui generis nature of the EU immigration law and policy under the EU 
supranational arrangement, in which the EU and member states exercise shared 
competence in relation to immigration.  
3. Show that the EU doesn’t face a unique migration “crisis” since currently there’s a 
global refugee crisis, whose brunt is borne by developing countries in the Global 
South. 
4. Establish that there exists an Africa-EU irregular mass-migration; a mixed 
migration involving “genuine” asylum-seekers and economic migrants while 
revealing that the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration is the principal fueler of the 
EU migration “crisis”.  
7. Reveal the double standards and arguable hypocrisy of the EU in relation to 
human rights and the rule of law.  
8. Demonstrate the liability of the EU and member states under international law, 
emanating from the EAM (Immediate Action) and its implementation in relation to 
the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration. 
1:5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The Research was essentially Qualitative and Library-based. The Research 
predominantly relied on primary sources. The gist of the thesis essentially is an 
analysis of the EAM, a European Commission document. The bulk of the literature 
used encompasses those authored by EU institutions and agencies notably the 
European Commission, the Council, the European Council. These documents were 
indispensible for the purpose of gaining insights into the EU vision for dealing with 
the Africa-EU irregular migration and the EU migration “crisis” generally as well as 
for tracking the implementation of the EAM Immediate Actions. “Hard” 
International law was extensively used, primarily entailing International law treaties, 
jurisprudence of international, regional and national courts as well as the 
jurisprudence of international treaty bodies.  
Secondary sources used prominently include textbooks, scholarly journals, 
publications by universities and NGOs, newspapers and relevant online publications 
and articles. The author endeavoured to use reliable and reputable secondary sources 
and publishers such as Oxford and Cambridge University Presses, Routledge, The 
15 
 
Guardian, The Telegraph (Newspapers), The Brookings Institute, Amnesty 
International, etc.  
A quantitative methodology is used to a very limited extent mainly to portray mainly 
the statistics of migrants e.g. the statistics of migrants journeying into the EU, 
statistics of migrants that died while irregularly crossing into the EU, etc.  
1:6 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Firstly, the author never ventured into the field to personally analyse the situation as 
well as verify the data and studies used in the research. Secondly, owing to time and 
space limitations, the scope of the thesis is limited to the Immediate Action of the 
EAM and the Africa-EU migration, mainly  the Central Mediterranean Route ( North 
Africa to Italy) since it’s the route  most used by the migrants involved in the 
migration. Even other Africa-EU routes, The Eastern Mediterranean and West 
African routes are examined minimally.  
It’s worth recalling that the EAM also addresses European irregular migration routes 
that feed the migration “crisis” i.e. the Eastern Mediterranean and the West Balkans 
routes.47  The EAM also has a long term agenda. (Long term actions) Both aren’t 
examined by the thesis. The gaps left by the study are worthy of exploration as there 
is hardly any literature on them.  
1:7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
First and foremost, there’s literally no literature that comparatively examines the 
EAM and international law.48 The thesis, by subjecting the EAM to international law, 
credibly breaks new ground in legal research. 
Secondly, the literature on the inherent deficiencies of the Refugee Convention that 
make it unfit for purpose today, especially in the face of the current asylum and 
refugee situation is very limited.49 The thesis advances research that questions the 
                                                          
47
 European Commission op cit note 1 page 5 para 6, page 8, para 2 
48
 A search of “The European Agenda on Migration” and “International law” on Google Scholar produces only 1 
article with a title bearing the EAM moreover, it doesn’t explore the relationship between  the agenda and 
international law, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=0&q=%22European+MIgration+Agenda%22+AND+%22International
+law%22&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5 accessed 24/9/2017  
49
 Some of the arguably most authoritive text books on asylum and refugee law like Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The 
Refugee in International Law, 2
nd
 Edition, 1996, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Plender op cit note 3, 
Hathaway op cit note 72, don’t discuss or even highlight the inherent deficiencies in the  Refugee Convention;   
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fitness for purpose of the Convention considering its racist,50 androcentric51 and 
parochial52 nature, while arguing for the adoption of a new, more humanitarian 
refugee Convention, cognisant of the hostility that most states are likely to have 
towards such a move.53 
Thirdly, the EU is generally presented as a normative power and humanitarian 
actor.54 The thesis uses the EAM and its implementation to probe the normative and 
humanitarian credentials of the EU. The study is hence significant since it uses the 
EU response to the migration “crisis” to establish whether the EU upholds its ideals 
and values, most especially when dealing with emergencies. This potentially reveals 
the double standards of the EU in relation to human rights and the rule of law, 
considering that the EU often criticises and “lectures” states especially in the 
developing world on human rights and the rule of law.55    
Lastly the study dispels the portrayal, mainly in the West that the EU bears the brunt 
of the current global refugee crisis. 56  The study produces evidence which shows that 







                                                          
50
 Chimni op cite note 8 
51
 Hans op cit note 9 
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CHAPTER 2: MIGRATION, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, ASYLUM AND THE EU 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines the relationship encompassing migration, state sovereignty 
and asylum. The Chapter opens by defining migration before making the connection 
between migration and state sovereignty (the ultimate determinant of the migration 
laws and policies of states) Asylum is then defined followed by an investigation into 
whether a right to asylum exists under international law. The principle of non-
refoulement is then discussed, (a principle largely considered as customary 
international law and conceivably the most consequential legal obligation that states 
have in relation to migration and asylum). Lastly, the EU is reviewed i.e. what the EU 
is, its unique immigration laws as well as the values on which it is built, values it 
aspires to promote internationally (human rights, democracy, rule of law)58 This 
Chapter is crucial in answering the main research question because it gives insight 
into the dominant factors that influence and shape the migration laws and policies of 
the EU and the member states, laws and policies generally considered hostile to 
foreigners. Secondly, the chapter is valuable in establishing whether the migrants 
moving into the EU through the Africa-EU migration have a right to asylum as well 
as protection under the non-refoulement principle. This is vital when interrogating 
the compatibility of the EAM with international law in Chapter 5. A review of the EU 
immigration laws and rules is relevant for determining the legal entity liable for 
international law violations during the management of the Africa-EU migration i.e. 
whether the EU, member states or both are liable. A review of the EU ideals is 
intended to set the backdrop for the evaluation of the EAM against international law 
mainly in Chapter 5. As a supranational entity that has assumed the mantle of a 
global champion of human rights, rule of law and democracy,59 the standard to which 
the EU and member states should be held in relation to compliance with 
international human rights law and international law is justifiably very high, perhaps 
even higher than that set for other states and supranational entities. 
2:1 MIGRATION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
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Migration is defined as a process in which individuals and groups of people leave 
their homes for various reasons.60 The current mobility of people is higher than ever 
before in modern history and continues to increase sharply, becoming one of the 
determining global issues of 21st century.61 Worldwide regulation of migration is a 
20th century invention.62 Although it was certainly the case that passports and 
border controls emerged at an earlier point in time,63 it was not until the beginning 
of the 20th century that the world was fully and firmly divided by borders, and the 
requirement of passports and visas to cross them.64 
International law has traditionally defined migration control as an expression of 
state sovereignty.65 The Black’s Law Dictionary defines sovereignty as supreme 
dominion, authority or rule.66 It defines state sovereignty as the supreme political 
authority of an independent state.67  
State sovereignty emphasises national borders and allows the exclusion of aliens.68 
In the present era of globalisation, control over the movement of people has become 
the last bastion of sovereignty.69 The prerogative of states in relation to migration 
was well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States of America (USA) in 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States: 
                    “…It’s an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation 
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid 
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the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases 
and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe…” 70 
It’s generally conceded as shown above that state sovereignty is the ultimate 
determinant of migration laws and policies of states. Nonetheless, the exercise of 
state sovereignty today in relation to migration is not absolute. Its exercise is 
fettered, though to a very limited extent by some factors, the most significant of 
which are discussed below: 
2:1:1 HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, STATES’ INTER-
DEPENDENCE: FETTERS ON SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Plender, Joppke, Hathaway, Chetail, Bauloz and Dauvergne agree that state 
sovereignty today in relation to migration is not absolute; conceivably, most 
significantly fettered by human rights,71 international law72 and inter-dependence 
amongst states.73 
Dauvergne acknowledges that state sovereignty in relation to migration is eroded by 
human rights, particularly the Refugee Convention. However, she emphasises the 
very limited extent of the erosion since entering the convention is a sovereign act in 
itself and as shown by Australia and Canada, states can blatantly violate their 
obligations under the convention without consequence.74 The author firmly agrees 
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with Dauvergne’s conclusion that state sovereignty despite its fetters remains 
paramount in relation to migration. 
Generally, the people who irregularly immigrate to the EU using the Africa-EU 
irregular mass-migration do so with the intention of seeking asylum in the EU. This 
implies that the exercise of state sovereignty by the EU in restricting the admission of 
the asylum-seekers is fettered under international law. A discussion on international 
law governing asylum and the principle of non-refoulement is therefore paramount 
for the purposes of this thesis. 
Below is the discussion on asylum: 
2:1:1:1 ASYLUM 
Asylum as per Krenz is the protection, which a State grants on its territory or in some 
other place under the control of certain of its organs, to a person who comes to seek 
it.75Asylum is an ancient institution of a predominantly humanitarian character.76 
a) RIGHT TO ASYLUM UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATY LAW 
Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaims that, 
"everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own."77 While strictu 
sensu the UDHR is not a legally binding instrument, it has been declared to set forth 
"the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and to 
constitute an obligation for the members of the international community."78 
Moreover, the Declaration has been said to be an authoritative expression of the 
customary international law of today in regard to human rights.79 Article 12(2) of the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) stipulates 
that people shall be free to leave any country, including their own, ”80  a provision 
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corroborated by Article 12 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).”81  
Article 14(1) of the UDHR proclaims the right of an individual "to seek and to enjoy 
in other countries asylum from persecution.”82 Professor Lauterpacht amongst 
others has criticised the language of Article 14(1) for giving the individual a right to 
seek asylum without specifying whose duty it is to give effect to that right.83 The 
principal international instruments relating to the protection of refugees, the 
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol also don’t provide a right to be granted 
asylum.84 Lastly, regional instruments also don’t provide for an individual's right to 
asylum.85  
b) RIGHT TO ASYLUM UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The existence of the right to asylum under customary international law has been 
argued by some. It wouldn’t seem too rash to submit that the international 
community subscribes to the principle that political persecutees aren’t to be returned 
to their country of origin.86 Considering the fact that the “general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations " constitute a material source of the law of nations, it’s 
doubtful whether the ICJ would actually deny legal validity to this principle.87 Once 
such a customary duty of States not to return political refugees is established, the 
logical consequence to this rule would be the recognition of the existence of an 
individual right to asylum.88 Doctrinal support for this viewpoint is not lacking, and 
an increasing number of authors have seriously considered it.89 Although a general 
state usage to grant asylum may now undoubtedly be established, a necessary 
element in the formation of a customary legal norm, i.e., the opinio juris on the part 
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of states, appears as still lacking.90 It would seem, therefore, that the realisation of an 
individual right to asylum is still to await some kind of formal legal recognition.91  
The author finds it safe to conclude that generally states have a right, rather than a 
duty, to grant asylum, flowing from their sovereign right to control admission into 
their territory. 
Below is the discussion on the principle of non-refoulement: 
2:1:1:2 THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT 
While there’s no obligation under international law to grant asylum to refugees, 
states are bound by the Non-Refoulement principle encapsulated in Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention.92 The principle is the cornerstone of refugee protection, 93now 
generally considered to constitute customary international law.94  A significant body 
of authorities argue that the principle is now jus cogens.95 The EUAFR interpretes 
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non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention to encompass direct and indirect 
refoulement; the former being a ban on the return to a country where a person would 
be at risk of persecution or serious harm, the latter being the return to countries 
where individuals would be exposed to a risk of onward removal to such countries 
(indirect or onward refoulement).96 
Though the EUAFR asserts the principle of non-refoulement in the Refugee 
Convention not only covers recognised refugees but also asylum-seekers, 97 Boed 
argues that the Convention only protects those determined to be refugees under its 
provisions,98 a position that the author associates with.  
As per the VCLT 99 a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.100 However, since the 1951 Refugee Convention 
preceded the 1969 VCLT, which legally commenced in 1980, the generally accepted 
law principle of non-retrospectivity of treaties applies.101  However, considering that 
the Treaty was drafted by the ILC,102 the rules of VCLT reflecting prior customary 
international law apply to treaties concluded before the entry into force of the 
VCLT.103 Pacta Sunt Servanda is such a rule.104Under this principle, it’s conceivable 
that states have a responsibility to provide safe haven and guarantee the rights of 
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refugees in their territories since this is the underlying purpose of the Refugee 
Convention. 
In addition, international human rights law has made non-refoulement an integral 
component of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, enshrined in Article 7 of the ICCPR105 and Article 3 of the Convention 
against Torture. (CAT)106 According to the Human Rights Committee, 
              “States Parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country 
by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement”.107 
Boed argues that while the Refugee Convention only protects those determined to be 
refugees under its provisions, the other international law treaties extend protection 
against refoulement to any person who would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.108 
All EU Member States are party to these UN conventions.109 The principle is 
conceivably entrenched in EU law. The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
stresses the need to comply with the principle of non-refoulement and so does the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Article 18 of the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights110 enshrines the right to asylum with due respect to the rules of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, thus including the refoulement prohibition in Article 33 of the 
convention. The ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 of the ECHR to encompass non-
refoulement. 
Below is the discussion on the EU examining its immigration law and policy and the 
human rights values the EU asserts to be based upon.  
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2:2 THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
The EU is a unique economic and political union between 28 European countries 
that together cover much of the European continent. What began as a purely 
economic union has evolved into an organisation spanning policy areas, from 
climate, environment and health to external relations and security, justice and 
migration. A name change from the European Economic Community (EEC) to the 
European Union (EU) in 1993 reflected this.111 The EU ranks as the world’s second-
largest economy by GDP.112By nominal GDP, the EU is nearly the same size as the 
USA and 63% larger than China.113 
a) EU IMMIGRATION LAW AND RULES 
Migration into the EU is regulated by a combination of EU law, national law, the 
ECHR, the European Social Charter, and international treaties entered into by EU 
states.114 
The EU and its Member States share competence in the area of immigration.115 There 
are certain common immigration rules valid across the EU, while other aspects are 
determined by each EU state hence a variation in immigration rules amongst EU 
states.116 Since 1999, the EU has been developing a common immigration policy for 
Europe.117 EU states have agreed that the EU should have common immigration and 
visa rules valid across the EU, an agreement inked in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. (2009)118 Common measures to date include; EU-wide rules 
that allow citizens of third countries to work or study in an EU state as well as EU-
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wide rules that allow citizens of third countries staying legally in an EU state to bring 
their non-EU family members to live with them and become long-term residents.119 
EU-wide immigration rules generally apply in 25 out of the EU’s 28 countries. 
Denmark doesn’t apply EU-wide rules on immigration, visa and asylum.120 Ireland 
and the UK choose, on a case-by-case basis, whether to adopt the EU wide rules.121 
Each EU state decides independently the following; the number of migrants to admit 
for work, all final decisions on migrant applications, rules on long-term visas and 
stays longer than 3 months and conditions for obtaining residence and work permits 
when no EU-wide rules have been adopted.122 
Notably, the EU through the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) manages the 
EU external border primarily motivated by the desire to maintain the functioning of 
the Schengen Area.123 EU member states nonetheless maintain competence and 
sovereignty over their respective borders.124 It’s envisaged that the EBCG will provide 
support for border control to all Member States when required.125  
b) THE EU, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
According to the EU itself, the EU is based on a strong commitment to promoting 
and protecting human rights, democracy and the rule of law worldwide.126 Human 
rights are at the very heart of EU relations with other countries and regions.127 The 
EU policy includes: working to promote the rights of women, children, minorities 
and displaced persons, opposing the death penalty, torture, human trafficking and 
discrimination, defending civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
defending the universal and indivisible nature of human rights.128 The EU also 
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pursues human rights dialogues with over 40 states and organisations, including 
Russia, China and the African Union.129 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The Chapter examined the relationship encompassing migration, state sovereignty, 
asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. It was acknowledged that state 
sovereignty is the most fundamental factor in the forging of migration laws and rules 
of states though to a very limited extent, state sovereignty is today impinged most 
significantly by human rights, international law and the inter-dependence of states. 
The legal analysis done showed that under international law, states have a right 
rather than duty to grant asylum. The analysis also revealed that the principle of non-
refoulement (generally considered to constitute customary international law) is 
conceivably the most consequential legally binding obligation that states have in 
relation to migration and asylum. A review of the EU immigration laws and rules 
revealed that the EU and member states generally share competence in the area of 
migration. Legal liability for breach of international law can hence arise for either 
entity depending on whether the breach falls under an area where the EU has 
competence or one in which a member state has competence. Liability may accrue 
both if competence is shared. Lastly, a review of the EU’s values (human rights, rule 
of law and democracy) show that these values were pivotal in the establishment of 
the EU and remain central in the Union’s operation. Additionally, these values 
underline the foreign policy and international relations of the EU. Therefore, the 
standard to which the EU itself should be held in relation to the respect, protection 
and fulfillment of these values is justifiably high. 
 
The next chapter explores the fundamental terminologies in the field of migration 
while interrogating the inherent deficiencies in the Refugee Convention that severely 
limit its suitability as the centrepiece of international refugee protection today.  
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CHAPTER 3: FUNDAMENTAL MIGRATION TERMINOLOGIES AND THE 
INHERENT DEFICIENCIES IN THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter defines the major terminologies in the field of migration while 
scrutinising the Refugee Convention, revealing its inherent deficiencies, which 
severely limit its applicability as the centrepiece of international refugee protection in 
today’s world.130 Moreover, these deficiencies also contribute to the currently broken 
international refugee protection system131 and consequently the current global 
refugee crisis132 of which the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration is part. The chapter 
commences by making the case for the relevance of the use of appropriate 
terminology in the migration discourse. Migrants, illegal migrations, “illegal” 
migrants, irregular migrations, refugees and asylum-seekers are then defined. The 
analysis of the Refugee Convention is done while defining refugees. This Chapter is 
imperative in answering the main research question because it’s essential for 
establishing the category of migrants under which the persons involved in the Africa-
EU migration fall as per international law. Recalling that international law offers 
different protections for different categories of migrants, the relevance of this 
categorisation cannot be overstressed particularly when analysing the compliance of 
the EAM with international law in Chapter 5. Secondly, by arguing that the Refugee 
Convention has inherent deficiencies that severely limit its relevance for the asylum 
and refugee situation today, the Chapter tackles a matter at the heart of the main 
research question i.e. why the international refugee system is broken. An 
interrogation of this question is vital if one is to gain an understanding of why 
currently there’s a global refugee “crisis” whose spill over effect is the EU migration 
“crisis”.  
3:1 WHY APPROPRIATE TERMINOLOGY IN MIGRATION DISCOURSE? 
 
The choice of correct terminology is crucial as often language contributes  to  shaping  
the  reality  which national  authorities  present  to  their  populations  and  the  
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world.133 According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants,134 
                                Using incorrect terminology that negatively depicts individuals as “illegal” 
contributes to the negative discourses on migration, and further reinforces negative 
stereotypes of irregular migrants as criminals. Moreover, such language legitimates the 
discourse on criminalisation of migration, which in turn,  contributes  to  the  further  
alienation,  discrimination  and  marginalisation  of  irregular  migrants,  and may even 
encourage verbal and physical violence against them.135 
Below are definitions of some of the fundamental terminologies in the international 
migration discourse through a majorly international law perspective; 
3:1:1 MIGRANTS 
 
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as any person 
who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away 
from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; 
(2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the 
movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.136 Usually the terms “migrants” 
and “aliens” are used synonymously, although there’s a slight difference.137 An alien 
is an individual who is not a national of the State in which he or she is present.138 
Intertwined with the definition of a migrant is the issue of illegal migrants and 
irregular migration discussed below; 
 
3:1:2 ILLEGAL MIGRATIONS 
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According to Samers, illegal immigration is an epiphenomenon of migration and 
citizenship policy or as many observers argue, illegal immigration is produced.139 
There can be no illegal immigration without immigration policy.140 The definition of 
those deemed “illegal”, “irregular”, or “undocumented” shifts with the nature of 
immigration policy; there are those who “overstay”, those who have “lost” their 
documents, those who falsify documents, those that enter clandestinely, rejected 
asylum-seekers, and more generally, the socio-legal “grey area” between illegal status 
and asylum-seeking status.141 
In the migrant advocacy community, there’s great opposition to calling people 
“illegals” or even “illegal migrants”.142 It’s argued to be an affront on human dignity 
to reduce one’s entire being to a single transgression.143 Indeed, until the later part of 
the 20th century, breaching immigration rules and regulations was not even 
considered truly criminal but was generally instead understood as an administrative 
infraction.144 The extraordinary transformation of the migration discourse in the last 
two or three decades is that people have been made “illegal”.145  
3:1:3 IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS 
 
The ECA cites the IOM while noting that there’s no universally accepted definition of 
what constitutes irregular migrations. From the perspective of destination countries, 
its entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorisation or documents 
required under the immigration regulations.146  
3:1:2 REFUGEES 
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The Refugee Convention is today “one of the most widely accepted international 
norms, and remains the sole legally binding international instrument that provides 
protection to refugees.”147  
In defining a refugee, The Refugee Convention first qualifies persons who were 
considered refugees by international instruments and international organisations 
that preceded the Refugee Convention itself and the UNHCR.148 The Refugee 
Convention then extends the definition of a refugee to capture persons who owing to 
events occurring before 1951 (European refugees in the aftermath of World War II)149 
and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.150 
Despite subsequent agreements that have moved towards universalising the Refugee 
definition under the Refugee Convention, the Convention’s diction today remains the 
litmus test for identifying  “real” refugees.151 Because many people don’t fit into the 
Convention’s definition of a refugee, they cannot be classified as such.152  Therefore, 
no state is necessarily responsible for their asylum.153 The Refugee Convention 
definition is increasingly irrelevant to the majority of refugees, who face violence on a 
broader scale and for different reasons than those of post-war Europe.154If 
individuals apply for asylum and aren’t granted refugee status as a result of not 
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fitting into this Convention definition they’re likely to be labelled “bogus asylum 
seekers”, illegal immigrants attempting to cheat the system.155   
Below is an analysis of the inherent deficiencies in the Refugee Convention: 
3:1:2:1 INHERENT DEFICIENCES IN THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION  
The inherent deficiencies under The Refugee Convention are numerous. This paper 
limits itself to some salient ones of relevance to the thesis i.e. eurocentricism, racism, 
individualism, parochialism and androcentricism.  
a) EUROCENTRIC AND RACIST 
The current refugee regime is the product of hegemonic Western epistemologies, and 
its existence and the continued privileging of Western conceptions of human rights, 
democracy, and freedom are co-dependent.156 The prescribed grounds for 
persecution were closely linked to the Eurocentric conception and concern for the 
denial of civil and political rights but not for the denial of economic, social and 
cultural rights advocated for by the Communist and developing states.157 The “myth 
of difference” at the time of its drafting presented non-European refugees as radically 
different from European ones, excluding the former from the Convention.158The 
Convention’s definition of a refugee was never intended to be universal.159 Refugees 
existed outside Europe in 1951 (for example in China, Korea and Palestine) but their 
plight and of their host countries were not considered by the Convention;160 
According to Rafiqul Islam, the articulation of refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention was meant to exclude particular problems and displaced people from the 
purview of the West and limit their responsibility.161 B.S. Chimni acknowledges a 
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“traditional” figure of the “normal” refugee created, was one who was “white, male 
and anti-communist.”162 
b) INDIVIDUALITIC, PAROCHIAL, ANDRO-CENTRIC 
Persecution in the Convention is limited to the individual as a victim. It doesn’t offer 
protection to masses of people fleeing persecution.163 This is unsuitable for the reality 
of many displacement situations today.164  
The Convention doesn’t actually define “persecution”.165 As per Wilsher,166 
                         “….It may seem astonishing that even 50 years and thousands of judicial 
decisions after its signature, the Refugee Convention continues to produce novel 
interpretations of central concepts such as the meaning of persecution and protection …”167 
When The Refugee Convention was negotiated, the agents of persecution were as a 
rule, states. The drafters recognised refugees to be fleeing oppressive, totalitarian 
and particularly Communist governments. The agents of   “persecution” are no 
longer necessarily state actors, but non-state actors, or even sub-state actors, rebels 
and militias.168  
The Refugee Convention is andro-centric. The word woman or gender is not 
mentioned.169   
Scholars like Andrew Shacknove170 and Michael Dummett171 argue for a rethinking of 
the definition of a refugee  based  upon  humanitarian  principles  in  the  broadest  
sense  to  replace  the  narrow confines of The Refugee Convention. However, most 
commentators agree that it’s unlikely that the 1951 definition of a refugee would be 
opened up to re-negotiation. Certainly a new Convention or Protocol is unlikely to 
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receive the near universal ratification currently enjoyed if it included a more 
generous or more inclusive definition of a refugee.172 
Perhaps the most crucial development formulated to overcome the defective Refugee 
Convention internationally was the 1967 Protocol: 
d) THE 1967 PROTOCOL TO THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION 
The African events pertaining to decolonisation in the 1960s particularly exposed the 
insurmountable difficulties posed by The Refugee Convention in protecting African 
refugees.173 This placed the modification of the Convention in the international 
spotlight hence the adoption of The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
1967.174 The Protocol “universalised” the refugee definition. It highlights (though 
very diplomatically) that the Refugee Convention covered only European refugees 
who became refugees owing to events occurring before 1st January 1951.175 It further 
states that new refugee situations have arisen after the operationalisation of the 
Refugee Convention and since these refugees aren’t captured in the Convention 
definition, there’s a need for all refugees to enjoy equal status.176 The Protocol goes 
ahead to modify with an exception, the provisions of Articles 1 and 1A(2) of the 
Refugee Convention by omitting the words, “As a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951” and  “As a result of such events” found in Articles 1 and 1A(2) 
respectively.177 Lastly, the Protocol strives to remove any geographical limitations as 
to who can be a refugee.178  
It’s worth noting that despite the formulation of the Protocol, it only modifies the 
Refugee Convention in relation to the geographic scope (Article 1). The rest of the 
Convention is left intact, conceivably poisoned with the racist, patriarchal and 
parochial spirit that informed the geographic limitations.  
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The IOM defines an Asylum-Seeker as 
                       A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other 
than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under 
relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the person 
must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or 
unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related 
grounds.179 
The UNHCR further elaborates that an asylum-seeker is someone whose request for 
sanctuary has yet to be processed.180       
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The Chapter made a case for the importance of the use of appropriate terminology in 
the migration discourse. Key migration terminology; migrants, illegal migrations, 
illegal migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers were defined. In the course of defining 
refugees, a critique of the Refugee Convention was done, exposing its inherent 
deficiencies and incapacity as the premier international legal instrument for the 
asylum and refugee dynamics and situation today. Lastly, the case made by some 
scholars for the re-thinking of the definition of a refugee was made while recognising 
the attempt by the 1967 Protocol to expand definition of a refugee.  
The next chapter explores the nitty-gritty of the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration 
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CHAPTER 4: THE AFRICA-EU IRREGULAR MASS-MIGRATION 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter brings into focus the Africa-EU irregular mass migration.  First, the 
push and pull factors of the migration as well as its modus operandi are highlighted. 
The generally recognised irregular migration routes emanating from Africa that 
collectively feed the migration are then examined i.e. the Western Mediterranean, 
Central Mediterranean and West African Routes while revealing the crucial role of 
Libya in the Central Mediterranean route. An understanding of the push and pull 
factors is critical for the research question because these factors are fundamental in 
determining the categories of migrants involved in the migration under international 
law.  This determination is needed in order to invoke the applicable international law 
and also resolve whether the EU and member states are complying with international 
law while receiving and handling the respective migrants. A review of the migration 
routes is also vital for the main research question. Firstly, it reveals that indeed there 
is an Africa-EU irregular mass-migration while disclosing the African and non-
African states from which the migrants emanate. Secondly, the routes are the 
“highways” that have enabled the EU migration “crisis” especially following the 
closure of all the other non-African routes (Eastern Mediterranean and West Balkans 
roués) that initially facilitated the migration “crisis.”181 Thirdly, the routes divulge the 
reality that the Africa-EU migration is essentially a “mixed” migration. Lastly, as 
shown in Chapter 5, the closure of the migration routes plausibly forms the backbone 
of the EU plan for ending the migration “crisis”. The EU’s zeal for closing the routes 
has played a major role in the serious affronts against international law by the EU 
and member states, also analysed in Chapter 5. 
Below are the push and pull factors of the Africa-EU irregular mass migration; 
4:1 PUSH AND PULL FACTORS 
The conventional wisdom underlying the Africa-EU migration discourse is that war 
and poverty are the root causes of mass migration across and from 
Africa.182According to the EU, the migrations are to escape from political oppression, 
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war and poverty, as well as to find family reunification, entrepreneurship, knowledge 
and education.183 
Below is an exploration of the dynamics of the Africa-EU migration on ground; 
4:2 MODUS OPERANDI  
The common portrayal of irregular African migrants as “desperate” and 
impoverished victims of “unscrupulous” traffickers and “merciless” criminal run 
smuggling networks is inconsistent with empirical evidence which suggests that the 
vast majority of migrants move on their own initiative, perceive the migration fees as 
an investment and most are relatively well-off.184  The Guardian reports that Africans 
trying to cross the Mediterranean can pay up to $1,000 and Syrians up to 
$2,500.185Although the vast majority of the people that irregularly migrate into 
Europe from Africa are nationals of states in North, West, Central and East Africa, 
other notable migrants come from as far as Bangladesh186 and Syria.187 
The Africa-EU irregular mass-migration is generally characterised by “mixed 
migration flows.”188 The IOM defines these flows as “complex population movements 
including; refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants’.189 
Unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of 
trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed 
flow.”190 
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People smugglers generally typically put migrants aboard old, unseaworthy fishing 
boats and of recent on small rubber dinghies.191 These vessels are overloaded and 
prone to capsizing.192 These vessels are generally equipped with poor engines, lack 
proper navigation systems and often have insufficient fuel to reach Europe.193 The 
vast majority of border control operations hence turn into Search and Rescue (SAR) 
operations.194 
Below, the routes that facilitate the migration are explored; 
4:3 AFRICA-EU MIGRATION ROUTES 
According to FRONTEX, there are 3 routes to the EU used by irregular African 
migrants; The Western Mediterranean Route, the Central Mediterranean Route and 
the West African Route.195  
4:3:1 THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE 
The Western Mediterranean route generally refers to the route from North Africa to 
Spain.196 A decade ago, migrants from Morocco to Spain were typically economic 
ones from Algeria and Morocco, hoping for jobs in Spain, France and Italy.197 Since 
then, however, they have increasingly been joined by sub-Saharan Africans, driven 
northwards by conflicts in Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and 
the Central African Republic. (CAR)198 In 2015, Syrians accounted for the biggest 
share of detections on this route.199 
The Morocco- Spain route had been a noted pressure point for years since 2005.200 
Co-operation between Spain and Morocco has since kept migrant numbers 
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comparatively low on this route.201 Additionally, Spain has step up coastal patrols, 
installed the SIVE maritime surveillance system along its southern border and signed 
bi-lateral agreements with Mauritania and Senegal while strengthening border 
checks at the main ports.202 Rising unemployment in Spain and fewer opportunities 
for migrant workers is also thought to be a factor.203 
According to FRONTEX, the following are the statistics of the irregular border 
crossings on the Western Mediterranean route from 2008-2016; 2008-6500, 2009-
6650, 2010-5000, 2011-8450, 2012-6400, 2013-6800, 2014-7840, 2015-7164, 2016-
10231.204 
4:3:2 CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE 
The Central Mediterranean route refers to the mixed migratory flow coming from 
Northern Africa to Italy and Malta.205 (The paper focuses on Italy since the country is 
the most attractive destination for irregular migrants who want to move to Western 
Europe)206 Libya has traditionally been a major transit point for Sub-Saharan and 
West African migrants along this route and the main departure point for crossing the 
Mediterranean though Egypt is increasingly becoming a significant transit and 
departure point.207 
Between 2011 and 2016, some 630,000 irregular migrants and refugees reached Italy 
via the Central Mediterranean.208 With the tightening of the Spanish borders,209 the 
closing of the Western Balkan route and the conclusion of the EU-Turkey agreement, 
the Central Mediterranean now acts as the main gate of entry for irregular migrants 
arriving in the EU by sea.210 
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The Central Mediterranean Route, on the one hand, originates in the Horn of Africa 
and runs via Sudan into Libya and to a much lesser extent into Egypt.211 Eritreans, 
Ethiopians, Somalis and Sudanese mainly travel this route.212On the other hand, 
there are routes through Chad and Niger Northwards into Libya, used principally by 
West Africans.213 A trend on this route concerns the secondary movements of 
asylum-seekers from Syria and from North African countries of first refuge to 
Europe.214  
In 2016, over 181,000 irregular migrants were detected on the Central 
Mediterranean route, the vast majority of whom reached Italy. The country  reported  
an  18%  increase  in  arrivals  compared  to  2015,  a number  surpassing  the  
previous  peak  of  2014.215  According to FRONTEX, the following number of 
migrants were detected on this route:  2016-2008; 2016-181,126, 2015-153,946, 
2014-170,760, 2013-40,000, 2012-15900, 2011-64300,2010-4500, 2009-11,000, 
2008-39,800216 
The pivotal role Libya plays in the Central Mediterranean route is discussed below; 
LIBYA 
Libya’s geographic location makes it an ideal platform for refugees and migrants to 
depart across the Mediterranean to the EU.217Libya lies at the crossroads of the 
Central Mediterranean route and represents the departure point for almost 90% of 
those seeking to travel to Europe.218  Smugglers  and  traffickers  exploit  an  unstable  
Libya as  the  main  country  of  departure (90%) was  followed  by  Egypt  (7%) then 
Algeria (0.6%) and Tunisia (0.5%).219 The Central Mediterranean sea route via Libya 
has long been popular; in 2008, nearly 40,000 irregular African migrants were 
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detected.220 The migration almost completely stopped in 2009 following a bi-lateral 
agreement between Italy and Libya.221 With the collapse of the Gadhaffi regime in 
2011, by 2013, there was no shortage of people desperate to escape Libya as the state 
imploded and violence escalated.222 In what is a de facto failed state, smugglers 
operate with impunity.223  
4:3:3 WEST AFRICAN ROUTE 
According to FRONTEX, the route between Senegal, Mauritania, Morocco and the 
Spanish Canary Islands was once the busiest irregular entry point for the whole of 
Europe, peaking at 32,000 migrants arriving on the islands in 2006.224 But the 
numbers dropped by 60% in 2007 following bi-lateral agreements (including 
repatriation agreements) between Spain, Senegal and Mauritania. Strengthened 
border controls also played a key role.225  
Migrants on this route were mostly from Morocco and Senegal, with others from 
Niger, Nigeria and Mali.226 The numbers continued to drop from 2007, until by 2012 
there were just 170 arrivals in the Canaries.227 The figure remained stable, rising to 
874 in 2015.228 
According to FRONTEX, the following number of migrants used this route; 2006-
2016; 2006-31,600, 2007-12,500, 2008-9200, 2009-2250, 2010-200, 2011-340, 
2012-170, 2013-250, 2014-275, 2015-874, 2016-671.229 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The Chapter examined the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration. The push and pull 
factors of the migration were reviewed in addition to its general modus operandi. The 
generally recognised routes that facilitate the Africa-EU migration as well as other 
pertinent details relating to the routes were discussed. This was followed by a 
                                                          
220
 FRONTEX op cit note 216 
221






 FRONTEX, West African Route, http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-african-route/ 
(accessed 12/6/2017 12.49) 
225











revelation of the “mixed migration” nature of the Africa-EU migration. Lastly, it was 
confirmed that currently, the Africa-EU irregular migration is the principal enabler 
of the EU migration “crisis”, following the “closure” of the other non-African routes 
(the Eastern Mediterranean and West Balkans routes) that previously also facilitated 
the EU migration “crisis.” 
The next chapter is the core of the thesis and answers the main research question of 
the thesis; Whether the European Agenda on Migration (Immediate Action) 


















CHAPTER 5: THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION AND ITS 
CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
The Chapter commences by defining international law. The international law 
applicable to the EU and member states pertaining to internationally wrongful acts is 
ascertained. The Chapter then introduces the EAM and thereafter analyses the 
compliance of the Immediate Actions under the EAM with international law. The 
methodology of the analysis is as follows; each of the six immediate actions and their 
implementation plans under the EAM are stated. The execution of the plans on 
ground is then examined. Each of the immediate plans, their respective planned 
implementation and actual execution on ground are then analysed through an 
international law lens; where the EU or Italy or both are found to be plausibly liable 
under international law, a demonstration of how liability accrues them is done. A 
conclusion for the Chapter is then drawn. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law is generally taken to be a system of rules governing relations 
among states.230States have been the typical subjects of international law.231 A 
proliferation of international organisations of recent has seen the extension of legal 
capacity to them as well.232 One of these is the EU, which has its own legal 
personality separate from that of member states.233 
Below is an illustration of the liability under international law of the EU when acting 
alone and when its actions and omissions are intertwined with that of a member 
state(s). This illustration is important for the Chapter because despite the EAM being 
mainly implemented by the EU, some aspects are implemented jointly by the EU and 
member states particularly Italy in the analysis under this Chapter.   
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5:2 LEGAL LIABILITY OF THE EU AND MEMBER STATES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The EU is an international organisation under international law. An international 
organisation is one established by a treaty or other instrument governed by 
international law, possessing its own international legal personality.234 However, 
some legal entities like the EU are not contemporary international organisations. 
Nonetheless, they are captured under the DARIO.235 Additionally, the Commentary 
on Article 48 in the DARIO by the ILC makes reference to the EU as an international 
organisation.236 The EU is therefore indisputably an international organisation. 
Below are selected crucial international law provisions that govern the liability of the 
EU as an international organisation. These provisions are indispensible when 
establishing the legal liability of the EU in relation to the EAM and its 
implementation:  
INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE EU AND MEMBER 
STATES’ ACTIONS AND OMMISSIONS 
 
An international organisation commits an internationally wrongful act when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to that organisation under 
international law and the action or omission constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of that organisation.237    
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organisation in the performance 
of the functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of the organisation 
under international law regardless of the organ or agent’s position in respect of the 
organisation. 238 
The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organisation is considered an 
act of that organisation under international law if the organ or agent acts in an 
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official capacity and within the overall functions of that organisation even where the 
conduct surpasses the authority of that organ or agent or contravenes instructions.239 
An international organisation that aids or assists a state or another international 
organisation in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the state or the 
latter organisation is internationally responsible for doing so if the former 
organisation does so with the knowledge of the internationally wrongful act and the 
act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organisation.240 
Recalling the EU’s supra-national structure, its acts and omissions often overlap with 
that of member states. The following provision is critical for apportioning legal 
liability in instances of the aforementioned overlap: 
Where an international organisation and one or more states or other international 
organisations are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the 
responsibility of each entity may be invoked in relation to the act.241 
If breach of an internationally unlawful act is committed; attribution and lack of 
justification can be proved against the EU and the member states, they can 
collectively, separately or one of them can be held liable under international law. 
Below is a discussion on the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) 
5:3 THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION 
Migration policies are now at the top of the EU policy agenda.242 It’s difficult to 
envisage that this will change anytime in the near future.243 Each of the relevant 
European institutions has positioned the migration issue at the heart of their 
respective agendas.244 During this same period a whole series of initiatives have been 
put on the table and heatedly discussed between the relevant institutional actors and 
EU member states, and indeed with third countries.245 These have been accompanied 
by a succession of inconclusive extraordinary summits and conferences reporting 
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mixed and obscure results about the kind of concrete steps the EU might take. The 
resulting picture is difficult for the general public to fully grasp.246  
The EAM brings together the different steps the EU should take now, and in the 
coming years, to build up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the 
benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration.247 The Agenda is a 
political document outlining priorities in migration, asylum and borders policies for 
the years to come.248 The document sets out a comprehensive approach to migration 
management, comprising immediate action and longer-term measures.249 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the Immediate Action under the EAM 
specifically addressing the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration. Resultantly, special 
emphasis is placed on Italy when analysing the actions of the EU and the member 
states towards asylum-seekers and refugees inside the EU since Italy is the major 
terminus of the irregular migration. 
5:3:1 IMMEDIATE ACTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON 
MIGRATION 
Below is the European Commission’s introduction to the Immediate Action under 
the EAM: 
                           The first part of the EAM (Immediate Action) responds to the need for swift 
and determined action in response to the human tragedy in the whole of the 
Mediterranean.250 This swift response must also serve as the blueprint for the EU's reaction 
to future crises, whichever part of the common external border comes under pressure from 
East to West and from North to South.251 
Below is the analysis of the compatibility of the EAM (Immediate Action) and its 
implementation with international law. The analysis is done in accordance to the 
listing of the Immediate Actions in the EAM; 1) Saving Lives at Sea 2) Targeting 
Criminal Smuggling Networks 3) Responding to high numbers of arrivals within the 
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EU: Relocation 4) A common approach to granting protection to displaced persons in 
need of protection: Resettlement 5) Working in partnership with third countries to 
tackle migration upstream 6) Using the EU's tools to help frontline Member States.  
5:3:1:1 SAVING LIVES AT SEA252  
The European Commission in the EAM states the following in relation to saving lives 
at sea: 
                     Europe cannot stand by whilst lives are being lost.253 SAR efforts will be stepped 
up to restore the level of intervention provided under the former Italian,254  “Mare Nostrum” 
operation.255 To triple the budget for the Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon, the 
Commission has already presented an amending budget for 2015 and will present its 
proposal for 2016 by the end of May 2015. When implemented, this will expand both the 
capability and the geographical scope of these operations, so that Frontex can fulfill its dual 
role of co-ordinating operational border support to Member States under pressure, and 
helping to save the lives of migrants at sea. In parallel to this increase in EU funding, assets 
(ships and aircrafts) are being deployed by several Member States.256 
In a nutshell, as per the EAM, the EU pledged to step up SAR efforts.  It further 
undertook to triple the budget for operations Triton and Poseidon so Frontex can 
play its border support role and save lives at sea. Lastly, it was guaranteed that assets 
will be deployed by member states to support the above operations.  
Below, the author traces the implementation of the Immediate Action after which its 
compatibility with international law shall be examined: 
IMPLEMENTATION 
To reinforce its capacity to save lives at sea, the EU significantly enhanced its 
maritime presence in 2015, tripling the resources and assets available for Frontex 
Joint Operations Poseidon and Triton.257 As of 1st November 2014, patrolling 
activities were taken over by the Frontex-led Operation Triton. Unlike Mare 
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Nostrum, that preceded it, Triton focused more on sea border protection rather than 
SAR, in the first nine months.258 This attracted heavy criticism from humanitarian 
agencies.259  In the first quarter of 2015, following its launch, 479 refugees and 
migrants drowned or went missing, compared to an estimated 15 in the first quarter 
of 2014.260 “Triton is not a replacement for Mare Nostrum,” Klaus Rosler, Frontex’s 
operations director stressed,261 “Frontex is not a coordinating body for SAR 
operations. The responsibility of member states to ensure SAR operations and 
maritime security on this is not substituted for or suspended by a border 
surveillance operation.”262 
2 major shipwrecks between in April 2015, claiming over 1,200 lives proved that 
Operation Triton was inadequate.263 The EU then reinforced the operation.264As of 
1st July 2015, Triton expanded its assets and spread its activities southwards.265 In 
2016, 48, 800 people were rescued by Triton. The 2017 statistics (as of August) show 
that 6,000 have been rescued.266On 22nd June 2015, the EU launched EUNAVFOR 
MED (Operation Sophia) (Elaborated upon later in Chapter 5:3:1:2) SAR operations 
aren’t part of its mandate though its naval and aerial assets have contributed to SAR 
operations.267Operations Triton and Sophia have remained focussed on their 
respective primary objectives: border control and surveillance; and disrupting 
smugglers’ business model for Sophia.268 
Frontex, citing UNHCR and IOM estimates, stated that 2016 (when Operations 
Triton and Sophia were in operation) saw the largest number of migrant deaths on 
record in the Mediterranean (5,083 compared with 3,777 in 2015 and 3,279 in 
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2014).269 There have been 2,244 recorded deaths on the Central Mediterranean route 
between January and August 2017.270 Even Frontex acknowledges the paradox of the 
increasing number of migrant deaths, despite the enhanced EU and NGO SAR 
operations.271 Wittenberg argues that these statistics portray the EU’s failure at 
saving lives on the Mediterranean through SAR operations, 272an argument the 
author strongly associates with.  
As a further reflection of the shortcomings of Operations Triton and Sophia, their 
efforts continue to be criticised by humanitarian actors, which has led many private 
and non-state actors to launch their own SAR operations,273 which have brought 
mortality rates down. 274 NGOs were responsible for about 22% of all rescues in the 
Central Mediterranean in 2016.275 A case can therefore be made that there is a 
vacuum in SAR operations plausibly from the reluctance of the EU and member 
states. Perplexing is the hostility of the EU governments towards the NGOS involved 
in SAR. They argue that SAR operations of NGOs have an “unintended pull factor” as 
they encourage more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing hence more 
tragic deaths.276 Others have accused NGOs for colluding with smugglers, claims 
Italian Parliamentary inquiries refuted.277  
From the above analysis of the implementation of the immediate action, the author 
finds it arguable that Frontex and EU member states prioritise border control over 
saving the lives of asylum-seekers in distress at sea.   
Below is an examination of the international law that governs SAR operations on the 
sea. This is juxtaposed against the actions and omissions of the EU and member 
states in relation to saving lives at sea as per the EAM: 
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 INTERNATIONAL LAW ON SAR OPERATIONS 
International treaty obligations are binding only if the parties concerned consent.278 
Not all EU member states are bound by the same obligations under international 
maritime law. For instance,  several EU states haven’t signed the amended versions 
of the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 and the Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue at Sea, 1979.279 For this reason, emphasis is placed on state 
responsibilities emanating from customary international law, which is binding on all 
states, obviously encompassing EU states.  
The UNHCR affirms that under international law, there’s an obligation to rescue any 
person in distress at sea including asylum-seekers.280 Vattel and Chitty assert that 
this duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea constitutes an ancient and 
fundamental feature of the law of the sea,281 widely recognised as a norm of 
customary international law.282 A number of international treaties specify elements 
of this obligation.283 Provisions of some of these treaties are highlighted below; 
                  “The master of a ship at sea… on receiving a signal … that persons are in 
distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance...” 284 
                   “Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag… to proceed 
with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need 
of assistance… “285 
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Additionally, States are also obliged under international treaty law to develop SAR 
systems, which can co-ordinate and assist in rescue operations.286 The duty to 
provide SAR services applies within the State’s SAR zone.287 Below are provisions of 
some key international treaties that divulge the obligations of states in relation to the 
development and co-ordination of SAR operations; 
                 “…Parties shall, individually or in co-operation with other States, ensure 
that sufficient search and rescue regions are established within each sea area…”288 
                  “Parties, either individually or in  co-operation  with  other  States  shall  
ensure  that  they  are  capable  on  a  24 hour  basis  of  promptly  and  reliably  
receiving  distress  alerts… within  their  search  and  rescue  regions…” 289 
Below, the paper argues that the duty to assist people in distress at sea is intertwined 
with positive obligations connected to the right to life. States therefore have a legal 
duty to be pro-active in saving people in distress at sea.  
DUTY TO ASSIST PERSONS IN DISTRESS AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
It’s clear that the duty to assist ships in distress requires positive action.290 The right 
to life291 is recognised to incorporate positive obligations for states in order to 
prevent the loss of life.292 In this sense, the duty to assist may be regarded as a special 
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corollary to the right to life. 293 The positive dimension under the right to life and 
under the duty to assist persons in distress at sea rests on states.294 
The ECtHR in Furdik v. Slovakia 295 feasibly made a link between distress and the 
positive obligations of states in relation to the right to life; 
                    …the State’s duty to safeguard the right to life must also be considered to extend 
to the provision of emergency services… this duty may go beyond the provision of essential 
emergency services such as fire-brigades and ambulances and… include the provision of air-
mountain or air-sea rescue facilities to assist those in distress… 296 
From the above, its arguable that the EU and Italy have fallen short in fulfilling their 
obligations under international law in regard to saving the lives of people in distress. 
Below, the author portrays the basis under which Italy and the EU can potentially be 
legally liable under international law: 
LIABILITY OF ITALY AND THE EU FOR BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law obligations in relation to saving persons at sea accrue to states.297 
In relation to the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration, Italy as a state bears the above 
obligation since it’s a close “safe country” for the vessels which use the Central 
Mediterranean Route to irregularly access the EU.298 In addition to the duty to 
rescue persons in distress being customary international law, 299 Italy has ratified the 
UNCLOS300 and ICMSAR301, which expressly stipulate the duty of states to conduct 
SAR operations in their SAR zones.302  
Recalling the possibility of joint liability of the EU and member states alluded to 
earlier,303 the EU is potentially legally liable as well. Under Article 6 of the DARIO,304 
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Frontex and its agents are an organ and agents of the EU respectively. The EU is 
hence accountable for the conduct of Frontex under international law. The EU 
therefore bears legal liability for Frontex’s failure to save the lives of those in distress 
at sea and uphold the right to life.305 Italy and the EU are hence potentially jointly 
liable for the failure to save lives of people in distress in the Mediterranean. 
Below is an assessment of the compliance of the second EAM Immediate Action 
(Targeting criminal smuggling networks) with international law 
5:3:1:2 TARGETING CRIMINAL SMUGGLING NETWORKS  
The European Commission plan for targeting criminal smuggling networks in the 
EAM is as follows: 
                              The criminal networks, which exploit vulnerable migrants, must be targeted. 
The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) presented options for possible Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify capture and destroy 
vessels used by smugglers. Such action under international law will be a powerful 
demonstration of the EU's determination to act.306 More will be done to pool and better use 
information to identify and target smugglers. Europol will immediately strengthen its 
recently established Joint Maritime Information Operation (JOT MARE) and its focal point 
on migrant smuggling. The result will be a single entry point for inter-agency cooperation on 
smuggling. Frontex and Europol will also develop profiles of vessels that could be used by 
smugglers, following patterns to identify potential vessels and monitor their movements. 
Finally, Europol will identify illegal internet content used by smugglers to attract migrants 
and refugees, and request its removal.307 
In summary, the EU has undertaken to use armed force against people smugglers. It 
also intends to intercept and disrupt online communications between people 
smugglers and potential migrants. Both these measures fall under within spheres 
regulated by international law. The use of force by the EU and whether it conforms to 
international law will be examined after a review below of how criminal smuggling 
networks have been targeted by the EU.  
IMPLEMENTATION  
To take urgent action against traffickers and human smugglers in the Central 
Mediterranean, Operation Sophia was launched on 22nd June 2015. It operates 
within the Libyan SAR with the ships remaining strictly outside Libyan territorial 
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waters.308 Sophia’s objective is to contribute to the wider EU efforts to disrupt the 
business model of criminal networks in the Central Mediterranean and thus prevent 
further loss of life at sea.309 On 25th July 2017, the Council extended the mandate of 
Operation Sophia until 31 December 2018.310 
The operation’s core mandate is to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and 
enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers. 
The operation is designed around 4 phases. The 1st phase, (concluded) saw the 
deployment of forces to build a comprehensive understanding of smuggling activity 
and methods. Currently the operation is in its 2nd phase, which implies the search, 
boarding, seizure and diversion of smugglers’ vessels on the high seas under 
conditions provided for by applicable international law. Future phases, subject to the 
necessary legal framework established by UN Security Council Resolutions, will 
include taking operational measures against vessels and related assets suspected of 
being used by human smugglers or traffickers inside coastal states territory. All 
activities as per the EU undertaken by the operation adhere to and are conducted 
under full respect of international law, including human rights, humanitarian and 
refugee law and the principle of non-refoulement.311  
Below is an interrogation of the international law applicable to the use of armed force 
as well as sovereignty, while revealing how the actions of the EU have been in 
compliance with the aforementioned international law: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF FORCE AND SOVEREIGNTY 
The UN Charter is unequivocal in asserting that all member states shall not use force 
or threaten its use against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.312 Further, 
the Charter authorises the Security Council to use armed force as may be necessary 
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.313 
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The EU has abided by international law in two ways: First, it has ensured that the 
vessels used in Operation Sophia strictly stay out of Libyan territorial waters314 as 
mandated by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Secondly, it has obtained a UN Security 
Council authorising the use of force prior to the use of force against the criminal 
smuggling networks.315 
Below is an examination of the compliance of the third Immediate Action under the 
EAM with international law. 
5:3:1:3 RESPONDING TO HIGH-VOLUMES OF ARRIVALS WITHIN THE EU: 
RELOCATION316 
The European Commission plan for the above Relocation in the EAM is as follows: 
                           Member States' asylum systems today face unprecedented pressure. The EU 
shouldn’t wait until the pressure is intolerable to act: the volumes of arrivals mean that the 
capacity of local reception and processing facilities is already stretched thin. To deal with the 
situation in the Mediterranean, the Commission will, by the end of May, propose triggering 
the emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) TFEU. The proposal will 
include a temporary distribution scheme for persons in clear need of international protection 
to ensure a fair and balanced participation of all member states to this common effort. The 
receiving member state will be responsible for the examination of the application in 
accordance with established rules and guarantees. A redistribution key based on criteria such 
as GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of 
resettled refugees shall be used.317  
                             This step will be the precursor of a lasting solution. The EU needs a 
permanent system for sharing the responsibility for large numbers of refugees and asylum- 
seekers among member states. The EC will table a legislative proposal by the end of 2015 to 
provide for a mandatory and automatically triggered relocation system to distribute those in 
clear need of international protection within the EU when a mass influx emerges. The 
scheme will take account of the efforts already made on a voluntary basis by Member States. 
Pending the implementation of these 2 measures, Member States will need to show solidarity 
and redouble their efforts to assist those countries on the frontline.318 
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In summary, the European Commission mooted to suspend the EU “Dublin System” 
319in order to relieve the pressures of the migration “crisis” on the frontline states. 
Further, the Commission adopted a proposal for the temporary redistribution of 
migrants from Italy and Greece to all the other EU member states so that burdens of 
the EU migration “crisis” are collectively borne by all EU member states in solidarity 
with the frontline states. These EU measures shall be juxtaposed with the applicable 
international law to test their compliance with international law after a review of 
their implementation below: 
IMPLEMENTATION  
This has been one of the most controversial ideas for dealing with the “crisis”; the 
main contribution of the initiative has been to derogate temporarily the guiding rule 
under the “EU Dublin system.”320 Under the EC’s initiative, EU states through a 
Home Affairs Ministers’ decision, adopted a decision for the relocation of 40,000 
refugees from Italy and Greece though as a first step agreed to the relocation of 
32,256 persons.321In September 2015, the EC proposed an emergency relocation 
mechanism for 120,000 refugees from Italy, Greece and other states directly affected 
by the “crisis” which the European Parliament voted in support of and the Home 
Affairs Ministers adopted.322 24, 676 people have been relocated since the launch of 
the scheme as of 24 July 2017; 7,873 from Italy. 323  
On the 26th September 2017, the Relocation scheme, which aimed at distributing 
160,000 ended.324  As of 4th September 2017, just 27,695 refugees had been 
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relocated.325 According to Amnesty International, European countries have utterly 
failed to fulfill their commitments to relocate asylum-seekers from Greece and 
Italy.326 Among the worst offenders are Poland and Hungary, both of which refused 
to accept a single asylum-seeker from Italy and Greece.327 The huge failure of the EU 
Relocation scheme has been met by heavy criticism from international organisations, 
UN agencies, EU institutions, and the European public, which perceive the limited 
progress as reflecting a lack of commitment to the cause.328 The EC has done its best 
to ensure the success of the plan but has been frustrated by the lack of political will 
from states. 329  
Amnesty warns that the EU states must step up and make good on their promises, or 
risk being taken to the European Court and potentially facing tough penalties since 
the relocation is a legal obligation. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EU RELOCATION 
As previously discussed (Refer to Chapters 2:1 and  2:1:1), states have no legal 
obligations under international law to accept asylum-seekers and refugees since, 
since it’s an area over which states exercise sovereignty and discretion.  
According to the UNHCR, an asylum-seeker may be refused a determination of his or 
her claim in the country where the application has been made, if the responsibility 
for assessing the particular asylum application is assumed by a 3rd country; provided 
there’s no risk of persecution in that country, there are sufficient guarantees that   the   
asylum-seeker   will   be   admitted , be   protected   from refoulement, have the 
possibility of his/her protection needs fairly assessed through  an  effective  national  
procedure,  and  be  treated  throughout in accordance with accepted international 
standards.330 As per the author, the EU Relocation Scheme complies with the 
                                                          
325
 Jacopo Barigazzi, Brussels to end mandatory refugee relocation (for now), Politico Magazine,  
http://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-to-end-mandatory-refugee-relocation-for-now/ (accessed 22/9/2017 
15.27) 
326
 Amnesty International op cit note 324 
327
 Amnesty International op cit note 324 
328
 Wittenberg op cit note 187 page 14 para 5 – page 15 para 1 
329
 Ibid  
330
 UNHCR, Convention Plus  Issues Paper submitted by UNHCR on addressing Irregular Secondary Movements 
of Refugees and Asylum-seekers, FORUM/CG/SM/03, 11th March 2004,  Page 8, Para 5, 
http://www.unhcr.org/afr/protection/convention/407110d03/issues-paper-submitted-unhcr-addressing-
irregular-secondary-movements-refugees.html?query=convention accessed 8/9/2017 at 7.17 
58 
 
criterion for relocation laid out above by the UNHCR and hence conforms with 
international law. 
The only concerns under international law are moral and humanitarian ones. The 
Relocation Scheme is generally acknowledged as a failure since less than a third of 
the eligible candidates have been relocated.331 The bulk of them remain in Italy and 
Greece, states whose capacity for hosting irregular migrants and asylum-seekers has 
been overrun, with the bulk of them living under dire conditions. The despicable 
conditions were authoritatively revealed in the MSS vs. Belgium Case, which led to 
the suspension of the Dublin transfers to Greece by member states.332 The Court 
found that Belgium violated Article 3 of the ECHR (prohibiting torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment) by sending the applicant back to Greece; 
exposing him to risks linked to the deficiencies in the Greek asylum procedure as well 
as exposing him to detention and living conditions in breach of the ECHR.333 In 
relation to Italy, the ECtHR held that there are “serious doubts” about the capacity of 
the reception system for asylum-seekers in Italy, with reports of over-crowding and 
poor conditions.334 
It’s noteworthy that though the EU states may not be liable under international law, 
they are plausibly liable under EU law since the Relocation scheme is legally 
binding.335 
Below is an examination of the compliance of the 4th Immediate Action under the 
EAM with international law. 
5:3:1:4 A COMMON APPROACH TO GRANTING PROTECTION TO 
DISPLACED PERSONS IN NEED OF PROTECTION: RESETTLEMENT 336 
The European Commission plan for the above Resettlement in the EAM is as follows: 
                                                          
331
 Amnesty International op cit note 324 
332
 European Commission, EU Asylum: Judgement of the ECtHR on the transfer of asylum seekers under the EU 
Dublin Regulation, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-1401_en.htm (accessed 4/2/2017 14.29) 
333
 ECtHR supra note 32 
334
 European Commission op cit note 332 
335
 Amnesty International op cit note 324 
336
 “Resettlement” means the transfer of individual displaced persons in clear need of international protection, 
on submission of the UNHCR and in agreement with the country of resettlement, from a third country to a 
Member State, where they will be admitted and granted the right to stay and any other rights comparable to 




                             In addition to the relocation of those already on EU soil, the EU has a duty 
to contribute its share in helping displaced persons in clear need of international protection. 
This is a joint responsibility of the international community, with the UNHCR given the task 
of identifying when people cannot stay safely in their own countries. Such vulnerable people 
cannot be left to resort to the criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers. There must be 
safe and legal ways for them to reach the EU. The UNHCR has endorsed a target of 20,000 
resettlement places for the EU per year by the year 2020. Some member states have already 
made a major contribution to global resettlement efforts. But others offer nothing and in 
many cases aren’t making an alternative contribution in terms of receiving and accepting 
asylum requests or helping to fund the efforts of others.337 
                               By the end of May, the Commission will make a Recommendation 
proposing an EU-wide resettlement scheme to offer 20,000 places. This scheme will cover all 
member states, with distribution criteria such as; GDP, size of population, unemployment 
rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees, and will take account of 
the efforts already made on a voluntary basis by member states. The EU budget will provide 
dedicated funding of an extra EUR 50 million in 2015/2016 to support this scheme. If 
necessary this will be followed up with a proposal for a binding and mandatory legislative 
approach beyond 2016. In addition to this common effort, the Commission calls on member 
states to make use of the existing possibilities offered under the Asylum Migration and 
Integration Fund and pledge further resettlement places under their national programming, 
with the funding swiftly adjusted.338 In addition, Member States should use to the full the 
other legal avenues available to persons in need of protection, including private/non-
governmental sponsorships and humanitarian permits, and family reunification clauses.339 
In summary, the European Commission decided that in addition to relocating 
vulnerable people on EU soil, EU states should fulfil their international obligations 
by co-operating with the UNHCR through receiving vulnerable people who have been 
earmarked for resettlement by the organisation.  The EU resettlement plans are 
juxtaposed with the applicable international law to test their compliance with 
international law after a review of their implementation below: 
IMPLEMENTATION 
As regards resettlement, the implementation of the July 2015 Conclusions to resettle 
22,504 people is well on track with over two thirds of the agreed number already 
resettled. This represents significant progress compared to the limited numbers 
Member States resettled in 2014 and 2015 via national or multi-lateral schemes and 
demonstrates the added value of strengthened EU-level cooperation.340 The EU 
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Member States received over 14,205 resettled refugees in 2016 via national and 
multilateral schemes. This is a significant in comparison to 8,155 people resettled in 
2015 and 6,550 in 2014.341 Progress continues to be observed in the implementation 
of the Conclusions of 20 July 2015, with over two thirds of the 22,504 resettlements 
agreed already completed. Since 10 April 2016, 671 people have been resettled under 
the scheme.342As of 12th May 2017, 16,163 people have been resettled to 21 States. 10 
out of the 28 Member States have not yet resettled under this scheme.343 
A majority of States participating in the scheme to implement the Conclusions of 20 
July 2015 indicated that their resettlement efforts were primarily, but not 
exclusively, directed at Syrians staying in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.344 The EU 
resettlement scheme is currently plausibly aimed at refugees in the aforementioned 
states345 However, there are now proposals to encompass African countries as well; 
The EC is set to launch a new resettlement pledging exercise in conjunction with the 
UNHCR starting with those in need of international protection from Libya, Egypt, 
Niger, Ethiopia and Sudan.346 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EU RESETTLEMENT 
As previously discussed, (under Chapters 2:1 and 2:1:1), international law doesn’t 
impose on states the duty to resettle refugees and asylum-seekers. Nonetheless, by 
resettling refugees, the EU and member states fulfill their international obligations 
under the Refugee Convention. However, considering that the EU resettlement policy 
favours Syrians staying in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey over other refugees in 
various parts of the world, the EU and the member states are potentially liable under 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20170516_twelfth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf page 3 para 2 (accessed 
11/2/2017 20.06) 
341
 Ibid page 9 para 1  
342
 European Commission op cit note 240 page 9 para 2  
343
 Ibid para 3 
344
 Ibid para 4  
345




 European Commission, Central Mediterranean Route: Commission proposes Action Plan to support Italy, 
reduce pressure and increase solidarity : Reinforce actions to reduce migratory pressure on Libya and fight 
smuggling and human trafficking, 4
th
 July 2017, Strasbourg,  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1882_en.htm (accessed 16/8/2017 12.06) 
61 
 
international law for discrimination of refugees, contrary to the Refugee 
Convention.347  
Below is a discussion on the compliance of the 5th Immediate Action under the EAM 
with international law. 
5:3:1:5 WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THIRD COUNTRIES TO 
TACKLE MIGRATION UPSTREAM 
The European Commission plan for working in partnership with third countries to 
achieve the above goal is stipulated in the EAM as follows: 
                            The EC and the EEAS will work together with partner countries to put in 
place concrete measures to prevent hazardous journeys.348 First, the EU should step up its 
support to the countries bearing the brunt of displaced refugees. Regional Development and 
Protection Programmes will be set up or deepened, starting in North Africa and the Horn of 
Africa. EUR 30 million will be made available in 2015/2016 and should be complemented by 
additional contributions from member states.349 
                               Secondly, a pilot multi-purpose centre will be set up in Niger by the end of 
the year. Working with the IOM, the UNHCR and the Niger authorities, the centre will 
combine the provision of information, local protection and resettlement opportunities for 
those in need. Such centres in countries of origin or transit will help to provide a realistic 
picture of the likely success of migrants' journeys, and offer assisted voluntary return options 
for irregular migrants. There’s an assumption here that the irregular migrants are economic 
migrants and have a choice of returning home.350 
                              Thirdly, migration will become a specific component of on-going CSDP 
missions already deployed in countries like Niger and Mali, which will be strengthened on 
border management. A dedicated summit will be organised in Malta in the autumn with key 
partners, including the AU, to develop a common approach with the region addressing the 
causes of irregular migration and the protection of people in need, as well as smuggling and 
trafficking of people.351This work will be closely connected to broader political initiatives to 
promote stability. Of particular importance is the action led by the HR/VP to address the 
situation in Libya, with full support to the UN-led efforts to encourage the process of setting 
up of a government of national unity.352 
In summary, the European Commission resolved that the EC and EEAS will work 
with third countries to prevent people from making the journey to the EU. The EU 
intends to do this in the following ways: a) Enhancing support to migrant hosting 
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countries b) Spurring economic development through financial contributions from 
the EU and member states c) Establishing multi-purpose centres in countries of 
origin and transit to discourage and prevent irregular journeys to Europe d) Making 
migration a specific component of the CSDP missions e) Working in partnership with 
other stakeholders to address causes of irregular migration and the protection of 
vulnerable people f) Engaging in political initiatives to promote stability most 
especially in Libya.  
Below is a review of the implementation of the partnership between the EU and 
African states for the tackling of upstream migration: 
IMPLEMENTION  
The EU is using a range of financial instruments to support the implementation of 
the Partnership Framework, most prominently the EU Trust Fund for Africa 
(EUTF).353 The EU has increased its interaction with the Sub-Saharan neighbours of 
Libya, to address the northbound irregular migratory flows arguably best defined by 
the by EU on 5th June 2017, announcing its intention to support the 
operationalisation of the G5 Joint Force (composed by forces from Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria and Chad) for securing sensitive border regions.354. 
These so-called tailored “compacts” with key third countries are being developed 
according to the situation and needs of each partner country; depending on whether 
they’re a country of origin, transit or one hosting many displaced persons.355 In this 
context, the EU uses all policies and instruments at its disposal, such as development 
policies, trade policies and financial assistance.356 Without concrete results from the 
partner countries in managing migration better, the EU reviews its engagement and 
financial aid.357The compacts serve the following purpose in the short term: save 
lives in the Mediterranean Sea, increase rates of return to countries of origin and 
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transit, and enable migrants and refugees to stay close to home to avoid people 
taking dangerous journeys.358 
Documents published by the European Commission on the Partnership Framework 
provide many examples of possible forms of co-operation, such as stricter border 
management in Libya and possibly in Egypt and Tunisia, the organisation of asylum 
procedures for the EU in Libya or other third countries, improved border 
management in countries such a Niger to avoid irregular migration to Libya or 
Algeria, re-admission agreements with Nigeria for its own nationals, projects in Mali 
to strengthen voluntary return of migrants in transit, collaboration with Ethiopia to 
speed up the return process of its own nationals.359  
Below, the author argues that the partnership in the EAM between the EU and 
African states is actually a vehicle for EU border and migration externalisation: 
EU BORDER EXTERNALISATION THROUGH THE PARTNERSHIPS 
Externalisation of migration controls describes extra-territorial state actions to 
prevent migrants from entering their legal jurisdictions or territories.360 These 
actions entail unilateral, bilateral, multi-lateral state engagement as well as the 
enlistment of private actors.361 These may include direct interdiction and preventive 
policies as well as more indirect actions, such as the provision of support for or 
assistance to security or migration management practices in and by third 
countries.362 Third countries enlisted in the prevention of onward movement of 
migrants and asylum seekers are at least implicitly encouraged to prevent migrants 
and asylum-seekers from entering their territories or to apprehend and return 
them.363 Externalisation is often deceptively framed as either or both a security 
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imperative and a life-saving humanitarian endeavour.364 Control of migration flows 
is cast as an effort to prevent “illegal” (or irregular) immigration or to protect 
migrants from the dangers of the journey.365 Externalisation is also framed as an 
exercise in capacity-building for countries of origin, countries of first arrival, and 
transit countries;366 capacity building for rule of law, human rights, conflict 
resolution, good governance, 367 migration control and management.368 
The EU Member States have increasingly moved border management activities 
beyond their territorial borders, extending border control activities to the high seas 
and third countries.369 Through the EU partnership with African states to establish 
concrete measures to prevent hazardous journeys, what has resulted is an 
externalisation of EU border control and management.370 Consequently, individuals 
seeking international protection are often pushed away from Europe.371 As EU 
Member States increasingly transfer migration management onto cooperating non-
EU states, the human toll of exclusion and the brutality of border management are 
hidden from the European social, legal and political landscape.372 Resultantly, 
irregular migrants often find themselves especially vulnerable to human-rights 
violations.373  
From the above discussion, it’s plausible that the underlying aim of the EU-Africa 
partnerships is the tightening of border controls in African states to curtail the 
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movement of migrants mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa to Northern Africa as well as 
from Northern Africa to the EU.  
Below is an assessment of the potential international law violations by the EU and 
Italy as a result of the EU border externalisation policy in Africa. Libya is used as a 
case study for the migration partnerships that the EU has with African states. Libya 
is selected because owing to space and time issues, the partnerships with all African 
states cannot be reviewed. Additionally, Libya, currently is the most crucial 
migration partner for the EU in Africa as discussed in Chapter 
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS IN LIBYA OWING TO EU BORDER 
EXTERNALISATION 
According to the European Commission, 
                           …To effectively cope with this current migration “crisis”, part of the answer 
must lie in the Libyan authorities preventing smugglers from operating and for the Libyan 
Coast Guard to have the capacity to better manage maritime border and ensure safe 
disembarkation on the Libyan coast... 374  
From the above, it’s arguable that the EU is pivoting its border externalisation policy 
on Libya; essentially aiming to prevent migrants from leaving Libya as way of 
curbing the EU migration “crisis”. This contravenes international law because it 
amounts to refoulement and a breach of the right to seek asylum, examined next: 
a) REFOULEMENT 
As thoroughly discussed earlier, (Refer to Chapter 2:1:1:2), the principle of non-
refoulement is enshrined in the Refugee Convention. Additionally, it’s generally 
regarded to constitute customary international law and also considered to be jus 
cogens. 
In June 2016, Operation Sophia's mandate was broadened to include capacity 
building and training of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard.375The long-term objective 
of these actions is to enable Libyan authorities designate a SAR area.376  
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In relation to the above, Amnesty International testified before the UK Parliament 
EU Committee that it was “dismayed” by the approach of “seeking to simply stop 
migration out of Libya via the sea route”, because this had the “prospect of returning 
or trapping people in a profoundly unsafe situation in the country”. In the absence of 
“any fundamental improvement in the human rights and humanitarian situation or 
capacity in Libya”, the EU’s focus on the Libyan coastguard risked “prolonging and 
exacerbating risk to human rights violation.”377 The position of Amnesty 
International reflects that of the author. Considering the above mandate of 
Operation Sophia and the concerns of Amnesty International, it’s arguable that the 
actions of the EU amount to refoulement.  
The case for refoulement in Libya through the actions of the EU is reinforced by the 
fact that Libyan law criminalises undocumented entry, exit, and stay in Libya, 
punishable by imprisonment, and in some cases forced labour or a fine.378 Libyan 
immigration law doesn’t distinguish between migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, 
victims of trafficking, or other vulnerable groups.379 Libya has not ratified the 1951 
Refugee Convention.380  
Moreover, the evidence of brutality against migrants in Libya is overwhelming.381 A 
December 2016 report from the OHCHR and the UN mission in Libya documented 
widespread arbitrary detention, inhumane detention conditions, torture and other ill 
treatment, forced labour, sexual violence, abuses by groups pledging allegiance to 
ISIL, malnutrition and abuses in immigration detention centres.382As a general rule, 
Libyan forces disembark people they rescue or intercept at sea in Libya,383 where 
they are extremely vulnerable to widespread human rights violations.384  It’s worth 
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noting that the IOM reports of slavery in Libya.385 It’s now a well-established 
principle that the “prohibition against slavery and slavery-related practices” has 
achieved the level of customary international law and has attained the status of jus 
cogens.386   
b) RIGHT TO SEEK AND OBTAIN ASYLUM 
As thoroughly discussed  previously under Chapter 5:3:1:5, the EU border 
externalisation, the prevention of asylum-seekers from reaching Libya as well as the 
prevention of asylum seekers from leaving Libya for the EU potentially violate the 
right to seek and obtain asylum. These actions contravene international law. 
Below, the legal liability of the EU for breach of international law is established: 
LEGAL LIABILITY OF THE EU  
The EU is feasibly liable for the commission of refoulement in Libya. The EU satisfies 
the requirements under Article 14 of the DARIO387 for international responsibility for 
an internationally wrongful act by an international organisation. The EU by assisting 
and aiding Libya in refouling migrants and asylum-seekers is responsible for 
committing the refoulement because the EU has supported Libya through training 
and logistics for the purposes of empowering Libya to prevent the departure of 
asylum-seekers from Libya well aware this prevention by Libya amounts to 
refoulement. Moreover, further in satisfaction of Article 14 of the DARIO,388 if the 
acts committed by Libya were done by the EU, it would amount to refoulement. The 
same legal provisions and arguments applied mutatis mutandis can be used to 
establish the EU’s legal liability for the violation of the right to seek and obtain 
asylum.  
Below is a discussion on the compliance of the 6th and last Immediate Action under 
the EAM with international law. 
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5:3:1:6 USING THE EU'S TOOLS TO HELP FRONTLINE MEMBER STATES 
The European Commission plan for using the EU’s tools to help frontline member 
states is stipulated in the EAM as follows: 
                           More will be done to help deal with the immediate challenge faced by 
member states in the frontline of migrant arrivals.389 First, the Commission will set up a new 
“Hotspot” approach, where the EASO, Frontex and Europol will work on the ground with 
frontline member states to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrant. Those 
claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where EASO 
support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible. For those not in need 
of protection, Frontex will help Member States by coordinating the return of irregular 
migrants. Europol and Eurojust will assist the host Member State with investigations to 
dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks.390 
                             Secondly, the Commission will mobilise an additional EUR 60 million in 
emergency funding, including to support the reception and capacity to provide healthcare to 
migrants in the member states under particular pressure.391 
In summary, the European Commission pledged to establish a “Hotspot” approach 
under which specialised EU agencies will help the frontline EU states deal with the 
migration “crisis”. Additionally, the Commission committed to the mobilisation of 
emergency funding to support the frontline states bearing the brunt of the migration 
“crisis”.  
Below is an assessment of the implementation of the last immediate action, focusing 
entirely on the “Hotspot” approach, after which the compatibility of the approach 
with international law will be examined. Focus is placed exclusively on the “Hotspot” 
approach because it’s the element of the immediate action that blatantly clashes with 
international law.  
IMPLEMENTATION  
Amnesty International referred to the “hotspot approach” as the flagship EU 
response to the high number of arrivals in Europe’s southern countries.392 A hotspot 
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is an area at the EU’s external border that faces disproportionate migratory 
pressure.393 Most irregular migrants enter the Union through these hotspots.394 
Pressured by EU institutions and other member states to abide by state obligations 
under the Dublin Regulations, the Italian government has been arm-twisted into 
violating international law when dealing with migrants at the hotspots.395 Firstly, in 
its pursuit of a “100% identification rate”, the “Hotspot” approach has pushed Italian 
authorities over what is permissible under international human rights law.396 The 
implementation of coercive measures to force uncooperative individuals to provide 
their fingerprints has increasingly become the rule, through prolonged detention and 
use of physical force.397 It’s against this backdrop, that refugees and migrants 
unwilling to give their fingerprints have been subjected to arbitrary detention and ill-
treatment by police.398 Whilst the vast majority of police abide by international 
human rights standards, consistent testimonies collected by Amnesty International 
indicate that some engaged in excessive use of force, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, or even torture.399  
Secondly, the “hotspot” approach also requires the introduction of an early, swift 
screening of the status of all individuals disembarked in Italian ports, to separate 
those believed to be “genuine” asylum-seekers from others believed to be irregular 
migrants.400 A screening process is conducted that isn’t based on any legislation and 
performed in haste (when individuals are still too tired or traumatised by the 
journey, before they have had a chance to receive adequate information regarding 
their rights and the legal consequences of their declarations).401 This modus operandi 
risks denying people fleeing conflict and persecution access to the protection they 
have a right to.402 The emphasis by European institutions and governments on the 
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need to increase expulsions has led to thousands of orders to leave the country 
following the above mentioned, flawed screening.403 
Claude Moraes, chair of the European Parliament’s Justice and Home affairs 
Committee, described the ECA Report on the Italian hotspots as “an alarm bell being 
rung” about the failures of EU states.404   
Below is an examination of international law potentially violated in the 
implementation of the “Hotspot” approach: 
THE “HOTSPOT” APPROACH AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
a) RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
As of April 2017, there were at least 20,500 children, predominantly from African 
states in the Italian hotspots.405 An appalling issue is the detention of 
unaccompanied minors in hotspots for prolonged periods of time with adults as 
specialised shelter capacity remains limited. 406 
                         “The amount of child abuse, rape and smuggling that is going on is 
horrific,” “If the EU is to have any sort of value it has to care for unaccompanied 
minors when they arrive in Europe.” Claude Moraes407 
APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) unequivocally mandates 
public or private welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies to make the best interests of the child a primary consideration in all 
actions concerning children.408 
It’s plausible, corroborated by the support of a significant number of scholars that 
the best interest of the child principle now transcends the CRC and forms customary 
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international law.409 The Committee on the Rights of the Children emphasises that 
individual decisions taken by administrative authorities in the areas of care, health, 
living conditions, protection, asylum, immigration among others must be assessed 
and guided by the best interests of the child. 410 
Furthermore Article 37 a) of the CRC stipulates that children shall not be subjected 
to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment411 while 
Article 37 b) directs that children shall not be deprived of their liberty unlawfully and 
arbitrarily.412  
The treatment of children by the EU in the hotspots as highlighted above feasibly 
amounts to breach of customary international law as well as international treaty law 
by the EU and Italy.   
b) RIGHT TO SEEK AND ENJOY ASYLUM 
The police are essentially tasked to do a first selection of those in need of protection 
hence placing a disproportionate level of responsibility upon an authority not 
competent or trained to do such work.413The border guards operate a rapid 
distinction between prima-facie “refugees” and economic migrants, with the latter 
immediately expelled without the possibility of a case-by-case decision as The 
Refugee Convention demands.414Most migrants don’t reach the actual venues from 
where they may seek asylum. 415 On many occasions people aren’t aware at pre-
identification that they are asked to state the intention to seek asylum.  Lastly, The 
number of interpreters and cultural mediators is insufficient.416  
APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law applicable to Asylum is expansively discussed under Chapter 
2:1:1:1. The UNHCR and the OHCHR have stressed that the right to seek asylum is 
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an individual right that needs to be assessed case by case by a judicial court.417 The 
EU as per Bello is currently applying the right to international protection as a 
“collective” right.418 
The mode of conducting asylum applications highlighted above feasibly amounts to a 
violation of the right to seek and enjoy asylum. The EU and Italy are plausibly liable 
for the breach of international law. 
c) NON-REFOULEMENT AND RE-ADMISSIONS 
In Italy, many return decisions have been issued based on the information provided 
in the pre-identification phase and the assumption that certain nationalities are not 
in need of protection.419 In addition to existing re-admission agreements, Italy has 
started concluding Bi-lateral co-operation agreements such as those with Gambia 
and Sudan that enable swift returns of individuals in an unlawful and non-
transparent manner.420 
As already discussed extensively above (State the Sub-Section) Non-refoulement is 
arguably the very cornerstone of international refugee protection. Its enshrined 
under The Refugee Convention, generally recognised as Customary International 
Law and is even entrenched in EU law. 
The practice of re-admissions of Italy plausibly amounts to a violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement. The EU and Italy potentially bear legal liability for this 
under international law. 
d) TORTURE, CRUEL, INHUMANE AND DEGRADING TREATMENT 
Some migrants interviewed by Amnesty International reported being subjected to 
torture to coerce them into giving their fingerprints. These included allegations of 
beatings causing severe pain, sexual humiliation and infliction of pain to the 
genitals.421 In a number of other cases, people recounted having been subjected to 
electric shocks by the police through electrical batons (stun batons), weapons that 
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inflict significant pain without leaving long-lasting physical traces on bodies.422 
Others stated that they had been denied food and water while kept under police 
custody, to force them into giving their fingerprints or as a form of punishment for 
resisting fingerprinting.423 
Reception capacity and conditions in Italian hotspots remain insufficient and are 
largely below standard.424The material conditions in the camps (quality of food, 
shortage of blankets, lack of privacy, inadequate access to medical care, water 
shortages, etc.) have been criticised by NGOs like Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and Save the Children.425 As early as 2014, the ECtHR stated that 
given the deficiencies of the Italian asylum reception system, the transfers of certain 
vulnerable persons such as children or families from other EU states to Italy in 
fulfillment of the Dublin Regulations may raise issues in respect of Article 3 ECHR 
(prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment)426 
APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The CAT defines torture as; 
                                Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person, 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or 
is suspected of having committed or intimidating or coercing him or a third person or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.427 
The prohibition against torture is now so widely recognised as a crime in customary 
international law, with a status of jus cogens.428 The CAT further criminalises acts of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment whose threshold falls short of 
torture when such acts involve public officials or persons acting in official capacities. 
429 
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A juxtaposition of the above actions and omissions of the EU and Italy with the 
applicable international law portrays that the 2 entities are plausibly liable for the 
violation of provisions of the CAT as well as customary international law in relation 
to the right to freedom from torture, cruel and inhuman treatment. 
e) DETENTIONS AND THE RIGHT OF LIBERTY 
Detention is used as a key measure to ensure the hotspots function.430 In Italy 
prolonged detention often exceeding 48 hours is used as a coercive measure to 
ensure fingerprinting.431According to the Italian Prisons Ombudsman, the average 
length of detention of migrants is 15 days in Lampedusa and 10 in Taranto.432 
APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
3 inter-related norms limit the decision to detain433; 1) the prohibition against 
arbitrary detention or deprivation of liberty,434 2) the right to freedom of 
movement,435 and 3) the right to liberty and the security of the person.436 These 3 
protections have been interpreted in the context of migration detention and all apply 
equally to non-citizens present in the territory of the relevant human rights treaty 
signatories, whether or not they are irregular migrants.437  
The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has made clarification in relation to 
Article 9 of the ICCPR (prohibition against arbitrary detention or deprivation of 
liberty).438 The UNHRC439 decided that Australia arbitrarily detained an immigrant 
when it failed to engage in an individualised analysis before making the decision to 
detain.440  It’s noteworthy that the international community has renewed its 
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attention to alternatives to detention.441  The UN General Assembly members in the 
2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants committed to pursuing 
alternatives to detention while assessing the legal status of individuals who have 
crossed or who are seeking to cross international borders.442 It’s arguable that the 
Declaration is “soft law” governing the detention of migrants. Perhaps as an exposé 
of the double standards of the EU in relation to detention specifically is the fact that 
the European Commission recognises the need for alternatives to detention in 
particular for women and minors in Libya.443 
A juxtaposition of the widespread practice of arbitrary prolonged detention of 
migrants and asylum-seekers in Italy with the applicable international law makes it 
very conceivable that the EU and Italy are liable for the violation of international law. 
Below is a demonstration of how Italy and the EU are legally liable under 
international law in relation to the “Hotspot” Approach.  
LEGAL LIABILITY OF ITALY AND THE EU 
ITALY 
As per Article 2 of the DASR,444 there’s  an  internationally  wrongful  act  of  a  State  
when conduct consisting of an action or omission a) is attributable  to  the  State  
under  international law; and b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of 
the state. The following actions and omissions of Italy constitute the latter; not acting 
in the best interests of children, denying the right to asylum to asylum-seekers, 
refoulement, perpetrating torture, cruel and inhumane treatment. These actions are 
attributable to the Italian state because they are perpetrated by Italian border guards 
and Police. Italy is hence liable for the commission of internationally wrongful acts.  
THE EU 
The liability of the EU emanates from Article 14 of the DARIO. The EU by partnering 
with Italy in the “Hotspot” Approach has and continues to aid and assist Italy in the 
commission of the internationally wrongful acts discussed above like denying 
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asylum-seekers the right to seek asylum, refoulement, torture, cruel, inhumane and 
degrading treatment, etc. The EU in line with Article 14 of the DARIO is hence 
internationally responsible because it conceivably does so with the knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act. Moreover, the acts committed by 
Italy, if committed by the EU would be internationally wrongful.  
It’s plausible that an argument could be made that Italy and the EU are acting within 
the confines of international law in respect to the violation of derogable (non-
absolute) provisions of international treaty law. The author hence finds it relevant to 
argue that the conditions that would permit Italy and the EU to legally violate the 
derogable provisions of international treaty law have not been met. 
5:4 DEROGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
Plausibly all the potential international law violations by the EU and Italy under the 
EAM are international human rights. Generally, the bulk of these rights are 
derogable. However, there are strict conditions under which they legally be 
derogated.  
Derogations allow states parties to adjust some of their obligations under the treaty 
in exceptional situations445 which one may argue the EU migration “crisis” is. 
However, the existence of a situation amounting to a public emergency is a 
fundamental requirement for triggering the derogation clause.446 States must 
officially proclaim a state of emergency, and notify the relevant international 
supervision body of the treaty, the reasons for derogation and the measures taken.447 
Neither the EU nor any member state has fulfilled these conditions.  
It’s noteworthy that the EU and Italy are potentially liable for the commission of 
torture and refoulement, considered to be jus cogens448 most especially in relation to 
torture. Acts considered jus cogens are non-derogable.449 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
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The Chapter thoroughly analysed the compatibility of the EAM (Immediate Action) 
with international law. It was found that only the second immediate action (targeting 
criminal smuggling networks) and the third one (the relocation plan) fully conform 
to international law. The fourth immediate action (Resettlement plan) complies with 
international law to a large extent though it contravenes it to a small extent. The rest 
of the immediate actions i.e. saving lives at sea, working in partnership with African 
















CHAPTER 6:  THESIS CONCLUSION 
 
The main research question of the thesis, answered in Chapter 5 was whether the 
EAM (Immediate Action) aimed at curbing the Africa-EU migration “crisis” complies 
with international law. In order to interrogate the main research question, it was 
expedient to answer some preliminary research questions in the preceding chapters 
(Chapters 2 to 4) mainly in the areas of migration, state sovereignty, asylum, the EU 
and the Africa-EU irregular mass-migration.  The answers obtained from Chapters 2-
4 were crucial for laying the foundation for tackling the main research question in 
Chapter 5.  
Chapter 1 offered a comprehensive introduction for the thesis whilst elaborating how 
the paper is structured.  
Chapter 2, in an attempt to understand the EU immigration law and policies 
generally considered “harsh” to foreigners investigated the relationship 
encompassing migration, state sovereignty, asylum and the EU. The Chapter found 
that state sovereignty is the most consequential factor as far as the migration laws 
and policies of states are concerned. The “Fortress Europe” EU immigration law and 
policy is hence generally due to the exercise of state sovereignty by the EU member 
states. It was acknowledged that to a very limited extent, state sovereignty in relation 
to migration today, is most significantly impinged by; human rights, international 
law and the inter-dependence of states.  After an examination of asylum, it was 
established that there’s no right to be granted asylum under international law. It was 
also found that the principle of non-refoulement is generally considered to constitute 
customary international law and is plausibly the most consequential legally binding 
obligation that states have in relation to migration and asylum under international 
law. Lastly, a review of the EU found that it’s a sui generis supranational 
organisation in which competence in the area of immigration is shared amongst 
member states and the EU. Additionally, the EU was founded on the values of human 
rights, rule of law and democracy, positing itself as a global champion of the 
aforementioned ideals. Therefore, the standard to which the EU is held in relation to 
the respect, protection and fulfilment of the above ideals is justifiably high.  
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Chapter 3 argued that it’s imperative that the appropriate migration terminology is 
used in the migration discourse, in light of which, the fundamental terms in the 
migration discourse were defined i.e. migrants, illegal migrations, “illegal” migrants, 
irregular migrations, refugees and asylum-seekers. Critically, while evaluating the 
Refugee Convention, it was found that the Convention by virtue of being Eurocentric, 
racist, individualistic, parochial, androcentric is inherently defective. This makes it 
unfit for purpose in relation to the refugee and asylum situation today. Moreover, the 
defectiveness has contributed to the precipitation of the current global refugee crisis. 
Chapter 4 confirmed that there’s an on-going Africa-EU irregular mass-migration. 
Generally, the push factors were identified as war and poverty.  Family reunification, 
entrepreneurship, knowledge and education constitute the pull factors. The generally 
recognised routes that collectively facilitate the Africa-EU irregular migration were 
found to be the Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean and West African 
Routes. It was acknowledged that the current instability in Libya has made the 
country the principal departure point for persons involved in the migration. Lastly, it 
was found that the Central Mediterranean Route is currently the biggest enabler of 
the EU migration “crisis” after the EU “shut down the Eastern Mediterranean and 
West Balkans routes that previously also facilitated the EU migration “crisis”. 
Chapter 5 tackled the main research question. It was found that the EAM (Immediate 
Action) complies with international law to a limited extent. To a greater extent, it’s 
incompatible with international law. Only the second and third immediate actions 
fully comply with international law. Under the second one, the EU acquired UN 
Security Council authorisation prior to the use of force in the Mediterranean. The EU 
and member states have also respected the territorial sovereignty and political 
independence of Libya in the conduct of operations in the Mediterranean.  Relating 
to the third immediate action (relocation); the relocation plan under the EAM is in 
accordance to the UNHCR guidelines on relocation and hence conceivably in 
compliance with international law though the plan has generally been considered a 
failure due to lack of co-operation of the EU member states. The Resettlement plan 
(fourth immediate action) generally doesn’t violate international law, resettlement 
being an activity that’s governed by state sovereignty, outside the scope of 
international law. Nonetheless, considering that the EAM Resettlement plan favours 
Syrian refugees over all other refugees, it amounts to discrimination contrary to 
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international law (Refugee Convention). The rest of the immediate actions generally 
contravene international law. The failure to prioritise the saving of lives of asylum-
seekers and migrants in distress at sea (first Immediate Action) plausibly violates 
customary international law and international treaty law. The EU migration 
partnerships with African states (fifth Immediate Action) credibly violate 
international treaty law, customary international law and jus cogens. The “Hotspot” 
Approach, a fundamental component of the EU Tools for helping frontline states 
(sixth Immediate Action) feasibly contravenes international treaty law, customary 
international law and jus cogens.  From the findings of the Chapter, a case can viably 
be made that the EAM (Immediate Action) addressing the Africa-EU irregular mass-
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